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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Temporary agency employment”, “temporary help work”, or just “agency work”: terms
like this wander through the news and headlines for many years and the discussion about
this controversial issue in labor market politics does not break off. There are people
protesting against it and labor unions are fighting against it. Sometimes, it even seems
that temporary agency employment gets stylized to the decline of the world of work
itself. This thesis provides a contribution to shed light on different aspects of temporary
agency employment and helps to assess advantages and disadvantages from an academic
perspective.
Temporary agency employment is a three-sided, atypical employment relationship in
which a worker is employed at a so-called temporary employment agency that acts as
an intermediary between a worker and a firm which uses the worker in its production.
The worker has an employment contract with the agency but is, by means of commercial
contract, hired out to a client firm that uses the worker in its production. The advantage
for the firm is that it can flexibly release the worker back to the agency when there is
no need for the task any longer. This characteristic contractual relationship distinguishes
temporary agency employment from other forms of temporary employment like fixed-term
employment.
Worldwide, about forty-three million people work in the temporary agency sector.
Compared to overall employment, this seems to be an insignificant number and it amounts
to “only” 1.7% of the global working population (WEC, 2017). However, it equals the
1
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amount of employed workers in Europe’s largest economy, Germany. Furthermore, in
countries like Germany the amount of workers employed in temporary agency employ-
ment has tremendously increased in recent years, more than sevenfold since 1990 (Jahn &
Weber, 2016a). Other countries, mostly European, show similar patterns. Overall, tem-
porary agency employment is unequally distributed and some countries use temporary
agency employment more intensive than others. The U.K. (3.8%), Australia (3.7%), the
Netherlands (3.0%), and Germany (2.4%) use temporary agency employment above aver-
age. Italy (1.2%), Denmark (0.8%), or Greece (0.1%) almost avoid deploying temporary
agency employment (WEC, 2017).
Crimmann et al. (2009) use the German IAB establishment panel to analyze in which
sectors temporary agency employment is used at all and, if so, in which intensity it occurs.
The authors show that it is most intensively used in the manufacturing sector, while
firms in the service sector almost do without this form of employment. Furthermore, an
important finding is that the bigger the firm, the more likely the use of temporary agency
employment. In the manufacturing sector every other firm with more than 250 employees
uses temporary agency work. In firms producing industrial goods or capital equipment,
about 5% of the workers are borrowed from an agency. Next to other management reasons
that are discussed below, temporary agency employment is subjected to the business cycle
and more intensively used in booms.
The reasons for engaging in temporary agency employment are diverse and both sides,
employers and employees, may have incentives to choose this form of employment. For
employers, the first and most obvious motive is saving costs and increasing profits (see
e.g. Jahn & Weber, 2016a). Due to the fact that there is no legal relationship between
the worker and the firm, most instruments of employment protection do not apply to
temporary agency work. Moreover, the costs for temporary agency workers are much
easier to calculate and to keep track of than for regular workers. The borrowing fee
includes all risks that an employer usually has to take into account when hiring a worker,
e.g. pension costs or costs of absenteeism. Second, by using temporary agency workers
firms can easily adjust the workforce in production peaks or balance workforce fluctuations
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(see Houseman, 2001; Ono & Sullivan, 2013).1 Third, if the task is limited to a short
time and there is no permanent use of the job, another advantage of temporary agency
employment is the lack of training time and costs (Crimmann et al., 2009). Last, adjusting
the work force by terminating the assignment of temporary agency workers in recessions
is less costly for firms in terms of publicity and reputation than adjusting the regular
workforce, especially if there is a strong employee representation which is the likelier the
bigger the firm is.
Empirical studies verify that there are substantial wage gaps of up to 25% between
temporary agency workers and regularly employed workers (see e.g. Jahn & Pozzoli,
2013) and that labor turnover is five times higher than for regular employment (Haller
& Jahn, 2014). Nevertheless, there are incentives for workers to engage in temporary
agency employment. Some workers, like students and young professionals, particularly
choose this form of employment to gain diversified professional experience in a short time
and, hence, to increase their attractiveness for potential employers (Crimmann et al.,
2009). Furthermore, employees see temporary agency employment as a stepping stone to
regular employment, to gain employability, and to earn money while maintaining freedom
and independence by not being stuck to a specific employer (CIETT/Ecorys-NEI, 2002;
Nunez & Livanos, 2015).
While countries like the U.S. have a rather long tradition of using temporary agency
employment, European labor markets are traditionally less flexible. This inflexibility
led to typically high unemployment rates and a high share of structural unemployment.
Furthermore, in most countries this is combined with strong and supportive welfare states
and social security systems. This is supported by strong labor unions and employee
representations. The coverage rate of collective bargaining in the European Union is,
even when it has declined over the years, still about 60% on average (Eurofound, 2015).
Thus, labor unions play a central role in the wage determination. Temporary agency
1Baumgarten & Kvasnicka (2017) use German data to show that firms that use temporary agency
employment in their production managed the financial crisis of 2008/09 much better in terms of business
performance and keeping the regularly employed workforce stable than firms that do not use this form
of employment.
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employment provides an alternative production possibility for the firms which becomes
more attractive, the cheaper it is relative to regular employment. Therefore, labor unions
clearly fight against temporary agency employment.
The institutional frameworks and legal regulations of temporary agency employment
are diverse and differ substantially across different countries. The UK, Austria, Denmark,
and Sweden have almost no restrictions in the use of temporary agency employment.
Other countries limit its use by time or sector restrictions. Two other important forms of
restriction are the synchronization and the re-employment ban. While the former means
that the contract between the worker and the agency has to exceed the assignment period
to a firm by a specific duration, the latter states that it is not allowed to lend the same
worker to the same client firm twice. Clauwaert (2000), Arrowsmith (2006), and Voss et
al. (2013) give overviews of the legal framework of temporary agency employment in the
European Union. However, as the high unemployment rates in the European countries
are the facing challenge in current labor market politics, there was ongoing deregulation
of temporary agency employment in the recent decades. Next to other suitable policy
instruments, e.g. reducing employment protection or paying wage subsidies for employers
who hire long-term unemployed, the deregulation of temporary agency employment is one
of the core instruments to make labor markets more flexible. An outstanding example
for a labor market reform that also included a radical deregulation in the temporary
agency work sector is the so-called “Agenda 2010”, the labor market reform of the former
German social-democratic chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der. Regarding temporary agency
employment, the main deregulating changes in this reform have been the abolition of the
maximum period of assignment and the removal of the synchronization and re-employment
ban (Antoni & Jahn, 2006). This reform, including the deregulation of temporary agency
employment, led to a rapid increase in employment in that sector – the absolute number of
temporary agency workers doubled sine then –, while the fraction of long-term unemployed
in Germany substantially declined; from 1.72 million in 2007 to 1.05 million in 2011
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2012).2
2Similar to Germany, there have been changes in regulations regarding temporary agency work in
almost all European countries (see Eurofound, 2008, p. 12, Table 5 for an overview of the most important
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With increasing importance of temporary agency employment in the political and
public discussion, it also gained more attention in academic research. Autor (2001, 2003)
provides a first theoretical contribution in the modeling of temporary agency employ-
ment by investigating the role of employment agencies in the screening process for regular
employment and by discussing why firms hesitate to fully substitute their workforce by
temporary agency workers even if they seem to be less expensive at first sight. Another
important theoretical contribution is provided by Neugart & Storrie (2006). The authors
suggest the increase in temporary agency employment to be caused by the improved
matching efficiency induced by temporary employment agencies that work as intermedi-
aries in the labor market matching of workers and firms. However, most of the research
in this field focuses on the empirical investigation of temporary agency employment. The
main issues that are addressed are the strategic use of temporary agency employment in
the production (see, e.g., Vidal & Tigges, 2009; Holst et al., 2010; Nielen & Schiersch,
2014), its effect on the employment structure (see, e.g., Jahn & Bentzen, 2012; Jahn &
Weber, 2016b), the wage differential between regularly and temporary employed workers
(see, e.g., Garz, 2013; Goldschmidt & Schmieder, 2017), and the question if workers can
use temporary agency employment as a stepping stone to regular employment (for recent
contributions see, e.g., Jahn & Rosholm, 2013, 2014; Givord & Wilner, 2015; Krekeler,
2016).3 Furthermore, due to the bad image of temporary agency employment, more re-
cently the job satisfaction of agency workers gains attention in research. Petilliot (2016)
and Busk et al. (2017) show that legal deregulation of temporary agency employment
leads to a decline in job satisfaction due to decreasing wages and increased job insecurity.
The present work enters the theoretical discussion of the effects of temporary agency
employment by picking up three different problems that have not been analyzed yet. Fur-
thermore, it combines research on temporary agency employment with existing literature
on labor unions to address the issues of European labor markets more properly. The
additional contribution to the existing literature splits up into three parts. Chapter 2
discusses the optimal economic behavior of firms and labor unions that face the potential
changes).
3See also Autor & Houseman (2005, 2010); Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008); Kvasnicka (2009).
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of using temporary agency employment in the bargaining process. Chapter 3 examines
the macroeconomic effects of the deregulation of temporary agency work on wages, em-
ployment, the employment structure, and the position of labor unions in the economy.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies how the technological choice of firms in the economy changes
due to the deregulation of temporary agency employment.
Chapter 2 (joint work with Thomas Beißinger) focuses on the question of the optimal
economic behavior of the bargaining parties when firms threaten labor unions in the bar-
gaining process with the use of temporary agency employment in their production. Based
on the work of Skaksen (2004) and Koskela & Scho¨b (2010), who use theoretical models
to analyze the impact of offshoring on collectively bargained wages, Chapter 2 provides
a monopoly union model to examine how and to what extend firms can strategically use
the threat of temporary agency employment to dampen the wage claims of the labor
unions. Furthermore, the model suggests how labor unions should optimally behave and
respond to these threats. Focusing on the cost-reducing motive behind the use of tempo-
rary agency employment – i.e. assuming that the decision about hiring temporary agency
workers is purely based on the comparison of the costs for different types of labor –, it is
shown that labor unions may find it optimal to accept lower wages to prevent firms from
using temporary agency workers. There are three cases that can be distinguished and
formally analyzed to describe the optimal behavior of firms and unions: most obvious,
when regular employment is less expensive than temporary agency employment, there is
no need for the union to adjust its wage claims. If, however, temporary agency workers
are less expensive than regular workers, the labor union may have an incentive to adjust
its wage claims downwards to the same level. It should adjust its wage claims downwards
as long as the decline in the utility of the labor union from adjusting the wage claims
is less than the loss that results when the firm indeed used temporary agency employ-
ment. Finally, if the resulting utility of the labor union from a downward adjustment of
the wage claims leads to an even lower utility level than when unions refuses to adjust,
unions should not oppose firms’ use of temporary agency employment, even if this leads
to a loss in regular employment. Distinguishing these three cases, the optimal strategy
of both bargaining parties and the optimal behavior in the negotiations can be revealed
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and formally be analyzed. The model enables to assess the different possible strategies of
the bargaining parties and to compare the resulting gains and losses in the negotiations.
It provides a significant contribution to the existing literature for different reasons. First,
as empirical research may tend to use data on firms that use temporary agency work and
compare this with firms that do not use this type of employment, the sole comparison
of both types of firms neglects that the actual influence of temporary agency work may
be unobservable when firms successfully threaten with its use in the negotiations. Fur-
thermore, if firms decide to employ agency workers, the model suggests that labor unions
increase their wage claims for the remaining regular workers to a level that even exceeds
the claims of the labor union if there is no threat at all. Drawing the conclusion that
a high wage level in a firm is the reason for using temporary agency employment in the
production may, therefore, be wrong. An intensive use of temporary agency workers in
high-wage firms may be the cause and not the consequence of the high wage level in those
firms.
While Chapter 2 focuses on the optimal individual behavior of firms and labor unions
and is in large parts limited to the partial equilibrium perspective, Chapter 3 (joint work
with Dario Cords) concentrates on the macroeconomic determinants. As stated above,
there have been continuous deregulation efforts regarding temporary agency employment
in almost all European countries aiming at an increasing flexibility in the European labor
markets within the last few decades. To describe and to analyze the effects of the deregula-
tion on the macroeconomic determinants like wages, unemployment, and the employment
structure, Chapter 3 uses a general equilibrium matching model a` la Mortensen & Pis-
sarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). In particular, it builds up on the work of Delacroix
(2006), Ebell & Haefke (2006), Bauer & Lingens (2013), and Krusell & Rudanko (2016),
who provide first theoretical models of labor unions in the matching framework, and
Neugart & Storrie (2006) and Baumann et al. (2011), who give important contributions
to the combination of the matching framework and temporary agency employment. The
model that is developed in Chapter 3 provides the first theoretical contribution that com-
bines labor unions and temporary agency employment in the matching framework. Large
firms produce differentiated goods employing regular workers that are organized in labor
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unions and, optionally, use temporary agency work for parts of the production to sub-
stitute regular workers. Furthermore, the model depicts the characteristic labor market
flows from temporary agency employment to regular employment, which is modeled as
on-the-job search. The model shows that the deregulation of temporary agency work leads
to a reduction in overall unemployment. Surprisingly, this favors regular employment due
to lower wages that arise from the impact that the more attractive production alternative
temporary agency employment has on the position of the labor unions in the wage bar-
gaining. However, the most interesting finding is that there is a hump-shaped relationship
between the degree of institutional deregulation of temporary agency work and its rate
of employment. This is explained by the fact that there are voluntary, non-institutional
regulations in the form of agreements between firms and employee representations that
become more important, the less regulated temporary agency employment is. They have a
counter-effect on the costs of temporary agency work that are lowered by the deregulation.
The model contributes to the discussion of temporary agency employment by combining
labor unions and temporary agency work in the matching framework. Moreover, it sug-
gests that one of the main arguments of the opponents of this form of employment is
not plausible. Different to what opponents suggest, the model shows that ongoing dereg-
ulation and flexibility in this sector does not inevitably leads to a steady increase in
precarious employment. This finding is in line with the fact that, even if there is some
volatility in the penetration rate of temporary agency work, it stays relatively stable at a
rate of approximately 2% of overall employment in most industrialized countries.
Chapter 4 picks up another aspect of the deregulation of temporary agency employ-
ment. As the technological orientation of an economy is not fixed, the ongoing deregula-
tion raises the question of how the technology choice of firms in an economy changes due
to the availability of the cheaper and, therefore, more attractive production alternative
of temporary agency work. As in Chapter 3, the model in Chapter 4 uses the match-
ing framework of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) and in particular
builds up on the work of Albrecht & Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2009). In their
influential contribution, Albrecht & Vroman examine the technology choice of firms in
presence of worker heterogeneity. Dolado et al. enrich this framework by introducing
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on-the-job search. The model that is developed in this thesis reveals how the decision
of firms with which technology to enter the market and to produce with changes with
deregulation of temporary agency work. It builds a setting with two types of jobs that
differ in their productivity and workers that randomly match with temporary agency or
regular job vacancies. Workers produce the same good, independent on which job they are
employed in, but the technology and productivity differs. Temporary agency work is less
expensive to hire for firms than regular workers as direct labor costs are lower and there
is no employment protection. However, job destruction and labor turnover is higher in
temporary agency employment. The model suggests that the legal deregulation of tempo-
rary agency employment deteriorates the technology level used in the economy, leads to a
more intensive use of the less advanced technology, and increases its employment. Regular
workers are shown to suffer from declining wages while the labor income of temporary
agency workers increases. Furthermore, it is shown that technological progress of the
technology used in the production with temporary agency workers even strengthens the
effects of the legal deregulation. However, Chapter 4 also provides an advice for economic
policy by suggesting that subsidies or other forms of support for directed investments
in technological progress of more advanced technologies may be suitable to dampen the
macroeconomic effects of the deregulation of temporary agency employment.
Finally, following the detailed description and analysis of the different models, Chap-
ter 5 provides a short discussion and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Temporary Agency
Work on Labor Union Wage Setting:
A Theoretical Analysis∗
2.1 Introduction
Usually, labor unions put up strong resistance to the employment of temporary agency
workers and the perceived weakening of pay and labor standards.1 However, as pointed
out by Bo¨heim & Zweimu¨ller (2013), in a given firm it is not necessarily clear a priori
whether the labor union will oppose the employment of temporary agency workers. The
reason is that cost savings and increases in profits could enable labor unions to extract
higher rents in firms that employ agency workers. The theoretical analysis in this chapter
sheds more light on the question whether labor unions may profit from the introduction of
temporary agency work or not. In more general terms, it will be analyzed how labor unions
react to the firms’ option to employ temporary agency workers and how this change in
labor unions’ wage-setting behavior affects firms’ profits, unions’ rents, and employment.
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Thomas Beissinger and has appeared as Beissinger &
Baudy (2015).
1See, e.g., Heery (2004) for the UK, Coe et al. (2009) for Australia, and Olsen & Kalleberg (2004) for
Norway and the US.
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As far as we know, this is the first theoretical paper dealing with the impact of temporary
agency work on labor union wage setting.
Temporary agency work constitutes a tripartite relationship, in which a temporary
agency worker is employed by the temporary work agency and, by means of a commercial
contract, is hired out to perform work assignments at a client firm. In return, the client
firm has to pay a fee to the temporary work agency. In the following, temporary agency
workers are referred to as temporary workers or agency workers. During the past few
decades the share of agency workers in the total workforce has significantly increased in
almost all OECD countries. Though the great recession starting in 2007 led to a cyclical
decline in temporary agency work, in many countries the agency work penetration rate
seems to resume its upwards trend. For example, in Germany the absolute number of
individuals employed in temporary work agencies increased by more than seven times
during the last twenty years, see Jahn & Weber (2016). Similarly, the agency work
penetration rate significantly increased in the European Union (with a peak in 2007),
Japan, or the U.S. (see CIETT, 2013).
Various motives are behind the use of temporary agency employment (see, e.g., Holst
et al., 2010). Some motives have to do with the firm’s necessity to react to a chang-
ing environment under uncertainty. In this case, temporary agency work is used as a
“flexibility buffer”. For example, the demand for temporary workers may be induced by
the needs to adjust for workforce fluctuations and staff absences or to deal with greater
uncertainty about future output levels (see Houseman, 2001 and Ono & Sullivan, 2013).
Other motives are more of a strategic nature and have to do with the potential of using
temporary agency employment to cut wage costs and increase profits. This strategic mo-
tive is well documented in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Mitlacher, 2007 and Jahn &
Weber, 2016). The focus of the present model is on this cost-reduction motive behind the
use of temporary agency employment and how this affects the “effective” wage bargaining
power of labor unions.
One of the results will be that the option to use agency workers may affect wage setting
also in those firms that do not employ temporary agency workers. This is an important
result for at least two reasons. First, empirical studies may come to wrong conclusions if
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they try to identify the wage effects of temporary agency work by comparing wage levels
for regular workers in firms with and without temporary agency work. Second, though
the share of agency workers in the total workforce is only about two percent in many
OECD countries, the impact of temporary agency work on the wage-setting process may
be much larger.
From a methodological point of view, the theoretical model developed in this chapter
is related to papers discussing the impact of international outsourcing on labor union wage
setting. For example, in Koskela & Scho¨b (2010) and Skaksen (2004) the firms’ option to
outsource some part of production dampens wage claims of labor unions. Lommerud et
al. (2006) analyze how international mergers might restrain the market power of unions in
oligopoly markets. In those papers, the outsourcing or merging option imposes a threat
to the bargaining power of labor unions, whereas in our paper the “effective” bargaining
power of labor unions is eroded by the possibility to replace regular workers by temporary
agency workers.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the the-
oretical framework and explains the components of the theoretical model. Section 2.3
derives the labor demand functions for regular workers for two employment regimes. In
one regime only regular workers are used, whereas in the other regime agency workers are
employed as well. Section 2.4 analyzes the wage-setting behavior of labor unions when
firms have the option to also employ agency workers. It is shown that three wage-setting
regimes can be distinguished. Section 2.5 compares the levels of wages, employment, la-
bor unions’ utilities and firm’s profits for the three wage-setting regimes. Whereas the
analysis in the main text focuses on a closed economy, Section 2.6 shows that the results
also hold in a small open economy. Section 2.7 contains a summary and some conclusions.
2.2 Outline of the Model
The model analyzes the impact of temporary agency work on labor union wage setting
using two modeling frameworks: the main variant focuses on the partial equilibrium in
a closed economy with monopolistic competition in goods markets, whereas Section 2.6
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explains how the main model equations have to be modified in order to describe the
general equilibrium in a small open economy where goods prices are determined by world
markets.
The following outline of the model is based on the modeling framework for the closed
economy. There are two types of agents in the economy: Besides workers, who supply
labor and do not own capital, there are also capitalists, who own the firms and do not
supply labor. There also exist two types of firms in the economy: Productive firms
produce final goods by using regular workers and possibly also temporary agency workers
in production. Temporary work agencies lend temporary workers to productive firms.
Between productive firms monopolistic competition prevails in the goods market. Because
of barriers to market entry (that are, for simplicity, not explicitly modeled) the number
of productive firms is given and monopoly rents are earned in the goods market. Firm-
level labor unions determine wages on behalf of employed regular workers and try to
appropriate some share of the rents for their members. Agency workers, however, are not
covered by labor unions’ wage agreements.
The model belongs to the class of so-called “right-to-manage” models, in which firms
retain the right to choose the employment level. In contrast, in an “efficient bargaining”
model firms and labor unions bargain over both, wages and employment. Whereas in
the first class of models the equilibrium lies on the labor demand curve, in the latter
case the bargaining outcome lies on a contract curve which usually is different from the
labor demand curve. Since the implications of these model classes may be quite different,
the decision to base the analysis on the right-to-manage model is justified in detail in
Appendix 2.A.1. The model consists of the following core elements:
i) Productive firms. The final good is produced using two segments (or rather inter-
mediate goods). The first segment can solely be produced by regular workers, whereas the
second can be produced by regular workers or, optionally, by temporary workers. Such a
production technology models the fact that temporary workers are mainly used for doing
simple tasks in the production process, whereas more important parts of the production
are done by regular workers. Formally, the technology of the representative productive
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firm is described by the production function
Y = Sα1 S
β
2 α + β ≤ 1, (2.1)
where S1 denotes the segment that can be solely produced by regular workers L1, whereas
segment S2 can be produced by regular workers L2 and/or by temporary workers L˜2. It
is assumed that
S1 = L1 (2.2)
S2 = L2 + δL˜2 0 < δ ≤ 1. (2.3)
Temporary workers might be less productive than regular workers, in which case δ < 1
holds. Thus, δL˜2 as well as L1 and L2 may be interpreted as labor in “efficiency units”,
where in the latter cases productivity is normalized to one. Total regular employment
is L = L1 + L2. Notice that, apart from possibly being less productive than regular
workers, temporary workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes for regular workers in
some areas of production. For example, regularly employed assemblymen or warehouse
workers may be (perfectly) substituted by temporary agency workers if the latter group
can be employed at lower costs.2
The goods demand function for the productive firm is
Y = p−ηQ η > 1, (2.4)
with p denoting the firm’s price relative to the aggregate price level and η denoting the
price elasticity of the demand for goods (in absolute values).3 Q is the share of aggregate
demand (being equal to aggregate output) that would accrue to the single firm if p = 1.
Since the focus of the first model variant is on a partial equilibrium model, Q is normalized
to one. If a productive firm wants to employ a temporary worker, a fee x˜ must be paid
to the temporary work agency. Real profits of the productive firm are
Π = pY − w(L1 + L2)− xδL˜2, (2.5)
2This assumption is also in line with Jahn & Weber (2016) showing that regular jobs are substantially
substituted by temporary jobs.
3This isoelastic goods demand function of the Blanchard & Kiyotaki (1987) type is often used in the
literature and can be derived from Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) preferences.
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where w denotes the gross real wage rate for regular workers and x denotes the real fee
per temporary worker in “efficiency units”, i.e.
x ≡ x˜
δ
. (2.6)
In other words, x denotes the costs of producing one unit of S2 if temporary workers are
used for production. Firms compare these costs with the costs w of producing one unit
of S2 using regular workers.
ii) Temporary work agencies. It is assumed that temporary workers are just on the
books of the temporary work agency when they are “idle”, i.e. agency workers only receive
a payment by the temporary work agency when they are assigned to a job at a client
firm. This assumption captures quite well the institutional framework for temporary
agency work in the UK, and to some extent the Netherlands or France, to name only
some examples. In other countries, such as Germany and Sweden, temporary workers get
an employment contract and obtain wage payments by the temporary work agency even
when they are not assigned to a client firm.4 However, as pointed out by Kvasnicka (2003),
hirings by temporary work agencies occur primarily on-call as a reaction to current client
demand to avoid the risk of initial prolonged unproductive employment of workers. In
other words, the first assignment of a worker at a client firm almost always coincides with
the moment the worker is hired by the temporary work agency, whereas activities such as
screening take place prior to hiring. Our assumption therefore seems to be appropriate
for the analysis of temporary work in a static model as it is considered in this paper.
It is assumed that the profits of a temporary work agency are equal to (x˜− ω− s)L˜2,
where ω denotes the gross real wage rate of the temporary worker and s denotes real
screening and search costs implied by the hiring of the temporary worker. Parameter s
may also be related to the degree of regulation of temporary agency work. For example, in
Germany a temporary worker was only allowed to work for a limited duration at the same
client firm before the implementation of the Hartz reforms. Hence, in case the client firm
4The latter case has been analyzed in the matching models of Neugart & Storrie (2006) and Baumann
et al. (2011). Alternatively, Neugart & Storrie (2006) also analyzed a model variant where workers are just
on the books of the temporary work agency, which did not affect their main results (see their footnote 8).
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intended to employ a temporary agency worker for a longer duration, the temporary work
agency had to find a new temporary worker for the same job, implying higher screening
and hiring costs.
Moreover, it is assumed that there is free market entry reflecting the fact that the
establishment of a temporary work agency does not imply large irreversible investments
as is the case for most productive firms. Since in equilibrium zero profits prevail, it must
hold that5
x˜ = ω + s. (2.7)
iii) Temporary workers. In 2008, the European Council introduced the Temporary
Agency Work Directive (2008/104/EC) to close the wage gap between temporary agency
workers and regular workers. However, Article 5 of this directive allows for derogations of
the principle of equal pay to uphold collective labor agreements that may establish other
working and employment conditions for temporary workers. As a consequence, in many
European countries collective agreements were drawn up for temporary agency workers to
circumvent the equal pay obligation. A wage penalty for temporary workers also results if
firms refuse to pay bonuses or payments made to regular workers that are not mandated
by collective agreements, or if they classify temporary agency workers into inappropriate
pay grades (Garz, 2013).
To capture the fact that in many countries temporary workers have a very low effec-
tive bargaining power, we follow the matching models of Neugart & Storrie (2006) and
Baumann et al. (2011) by assuming that agencies are able to set the wage ω equal to the
reservation wage of workers.6 The temporary work agency therefore offers a wage mak-
ing its workers at the margin indifferent to either being hired by the agency or staying
5The assumption of free market entry is not appropriate for countries in which the establishment
of a temporary work agency is restricted by government regulation. In that case eq. (2.7) should be
interpreted as a simple shortcut to capture the fact that the fee x˜ claimed by the temporary work agency
is positively related to screening costs s and the wage rate ω of a temporary worker.
6The fact that temporary workers often have a very low bargaining power is also pointed out in
Eurofound (2008). According to this study, research findings also suggest that agency workers may have
limited knowledge of their rights or the means to apply them.
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unemployed. From these matching models it is known that the payment of temporary
workers may be lower than, equal to, or greater than unemployment benefits depending
on whether temporary workers find regular jobs more likely than unemployed workers or
not (see eqs. (16) and (17) in Baumann et al., 2011). It is assumed that the temporary
work agency offers a gross real wage ω so that the net real wage ωn equals net unemploy-
ment benefits bn. Implicitly, it is therefore assumed that the job finding probability is
the same for unemployed and temporary workers. Net wages and benefits are defined as
ωn ≡ (1 − τw)ω and bn ≡ (1 − τb)b, where τw and τb denote the tax rates for wages and
benefits, respectively. Hence, it is taken into account that in many countries unemploy-
ment benefits are also subject to income taxation. As in Beissinger & Egger (2004), we
consider a situation in which (1 − τb) = φ(1 − τw), with φ ≥ 1. The government often
imposes a lower tax burden on unemployment benefits implying φ > 1, whereas if taxes
on wages and unemployment benefits are the same, φ = 1. The assumption ωn = bn then
implies
ω = φb with φ ≥ 1. (2.8)
iv) Labor unions. It is assumed that all employed regular workers are union members.
Firm-level labor unions determine the wage for regular workers by maximizing the rent
accruing to their members.7 The rent of a single union member equals the differential
between the net wage at the respective firm and the net income obtained as outside
option.8 For the determination of the outside option it must be taken into account that
a regular worker being dismissed by the firm under consideration may either end up as a
unemployed worker or finds a job as a temporary worker. However, because of eq. (2.8),
the net wage of a temporary worker equals net unemployment benefits. As a consequence,
the outside option of a regular worker simply amounts to net unemployment benefits.
7The chapter considers a monopoly union model instead of a Nash bargaining model in order to keep
the analysis as simple as possible. It is well known from the literature that a Nash bargaining model does
not change the qualitative results derived from a monopoly union model.
8In Strifler & Beissinger (2016) unions not only take the outside option into account, but also care
about an internal reference related to the firm (e.g. profits per worker). However, such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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The utility function of the representative union is the rent of a single worker times the
number of regular workers at the firm under consideration, i.e. U = L(wn − bn), where
wn ≡ (1−τw)w denotes the net real wage of regular workers.9 Because (1−τb) = φ(1−τw)
the labor union utility function can be rewritten as
U = L (1− τw) (w − φb), with φ ≥ 1. (2.9)
v) Government budget constraint. In the partial equilibrium version of the model
it would not be necessary to take explicit account of taxes and the government budget
constraint. However, in the general equilibrium version the government budget constraint
“closes” the model and shows how tax receipts are used to finance unemployment benefits.
In the case of a balanced budget
τww(L1 + L2) + τwωL˜2 = (1− τb) b [1− L1 − L2 − L˜2]. (2.10)
The government may determine the level of net unemployment benefits by choosing τb
and b. From the condition for a balanced budget then tax rate τw follows.
vi) Solution of the model. In the model, the agents’ decisions are taken in two stages.
In the first stage, the labor union determines the wage level for regular workers and the
temporary work agency determines the fee it claims for the employment of an agency
worker at a client firm. Because of the zero profit condition for temporary work agencies
in eq. (2.7), the earnings equation (2.8) for agency workers, and eq. (2.6), the fee for an
agency worker (in efficiency units) simply is x = (φb+ s)/δ. In the second stage, the firm
decides on whether to use temporary workers or not and also determines the employment
levels of regular workers and (possibly) temporary workers. This is taken into account
by the labor union in the determination of the wage level. In order to obtain a subgame
perfect equilibrium, the two-stage game must be solved by backward induction. Notice
9As is explained in Appendix A.1 in Strifler & Beissinger (2016), other well-known specifications of
the union utility function, such as the expected utility function, are not fully consistent with a general
equilibrium model. Since our model can also be interpreted as the general equilibrium in a small open
economy, we assume rent-maximizing unions in our model.
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that the firm’s decision to employ temporary workers can be made quite “spontaneously”
and can be easily reversed, since it does not require irreversible investment decisions.
Hence, it is quite natural to assume that labor union wages are determined before the
firm decides on the use of temporary agency workers and not the other way around.
2.3 The Determination of Labor Demand
In stage 2, each productive firm chooses the number of regular and temporary workers.
The fee x to be paid to the temporary employment agency for a temporary worker (in
efficiency units) and the wage rate w for a regular worker are already determined (from
stage 1). Inserting eqs. (2.1) to (2.4) into eq. (2.5), the profit maximization problem of
the representative firm is10
max
L1,L2,L˜2
pi = Lακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ − w(L1 + L2)− xδL˜2 s.t. L2 ≥ 0, L˜2 ≥ 0, (2.11)
where the parameter κ is defined as κ ≡ (η − 1)/η, with 0 < κ < 1. The lower κ, the
higher the monopoly power of firms. The first-order conditions are
∂pi
∂L1
= ακLακ−11 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ − w = 0,
∂pi
∂L2
= βκLακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ−1 − w ≤ 0, L2 ≥ 0, ∂pi
∂L2
L2 = 0,
∂pi
∂L˜2
= βκLακ1 (L2 + δL˜2)
βκ−1 − x ≤ 0, L˜2 ≥ 0, ∂pi
∂L˜2
L˜2 = 0.
It follows from the first-order conditions that three cases can be distinguished depending
on whether the wage rate w for regular workers is lower than, equal to, or higher than
the costs x of temporary workers.
Case I: w < x.
If w < x, it is cheaper to employ only regular workers, hence L2 > 0 and L˜2 = 0. From
10Because of eq. (2.1), both segments are essential for production. The corresponding labor input
conditions L1 > 0 and L2 + L˜2 > 0 are not explicitly taken into account in eq. (2.11).
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the first-order conditions the following labor demand functions are obtained
L1 = L1(w) = A1 · w−1/[1−κ(α+β)], (2.12)
L2 = L2(w) = A2 · w−1/[1−κ(α+β)], (2.13)
with
A1 ≡
[
(ακ)1−βκ · (βκ)βκ]1/[1−κ(α+β)] and A2 ≡ [(ακ)ακ · (βκ)1−ακ]1/[1−κ(α+β)]. (2.14)
Therefore, total labor demand L for regular workers is given by
L = Lr(w) = (A1 + A2)w
−1/[1−κ(α+β)], (2.15)
where the index r denotes the situation in which only regular workers are employed. The
wage elasticity of labor demand (in absolute values), denoted as εr, is
εr =
1
1− κ(α + β) . (2.16)
Case II: w = x.
This situation describes the borderline case in which the firm is indifferent between em-
ploying regular workers and temporary workers in the production of S2. The number of
regular workers in the production of S2 could therefore vary between 0 and L2(x), where
L2(x) denotes the labor demand function L2(w) from eq. (2.13) evaluated at w = x. For
ease of exposition it is assumed that the firm only employs regular workers if w = x.11
Hence, in case II the same labor demand demand function for regular workers as in
eq. (2.15) (evaluated at w = x) results, i.e.
L = Lr(x) = (A1 + A2)x
−1/[1−κ(α+β)]. (2.17)
Case III: w > x.
In this case, profits are maximized by using only temporary workers in the production of
S2, hence L2 = 0 and L˜2 > 0. The labor demand functions are
L1 = L1(w, x) = A1
[
w−(1−βκ) x−βκ
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
L˜2 = L˜2(w, x) = (1/δ)A2
[
w−ακ x−(1−ακ)
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
, (2.18)
11This behavior would result if the labor union claimed a wage w that is marginally lower than x.
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with A1 and A2 being defined as in case I, see eq. (2.14). Total labor demand for regular
workers in case III equals L1, i.e.
L = Lt(w, x) = A1
[
w−(1−βκ) x−βκ
]1/[1−κ(α+β)]
, (2.19)
where the index t denotes the situation in which only temporary workers are employed
in the production of S2. In this case, the demand for regular workers also depends on
the fee for temporary workers because of the complementarities in production between
segments S1 and S2. For example, if the number of temporary workers in the production
of S2 is reduced because these workers become more expensive, the demand for regular
workers in the production of S1 is reduced as well. The wage elasticity of labor demand
for regular workers (in absolute values) now becomes
εt =
(1− βκ)
1− κ(α + β) . (2.20)
Notice that both labor demand elasticities, εr and εt, are constant and greater than one.
Moreover, notice that εt < εr holds. If temporary workers are employed as well, the
labor demand elasticity for regular workers gets smaller (in absolute values) because of
the decline in the share of regular employment in total costs.
2.4 Union Wage Determination for Regular Workers
In stage 1, labor unions choose the wage that maximizes the economic rent for employed
regular members, defined in eq. (2.9), taking into account that employment is determined
by firms in stage 2. Whether firms use temporary agency workers or not depends on the
size of the fee for temporary workers relative to the wage that has to be paid to regular
workers. Segment S2 is produced by regular workers if w ≤ x, whereas it is produced
by temporary workers if w > x. Since labor unions determine the wage w for regular
workers, their actions also affect the employment level chosen by firms.
In the following analysis it will turn out that there exist three wage-setting regimes,
denoted as regimes R, X, and T , respectively. In regime R, the representative labor union
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claims the wage wR, defined as the monopoly wage if the labor demand function is Lr(w),
and the corresponding firm chooses the employment level Lr(wR). In regime X, the labor
union finds it optimal to set a wage wX = x that equals the fee for temporary workers and
the employment level is Lr(x). In regime T , the labor union claims the wage wT , defined
as the monopoly wage if the labor demand function is Lt(w, x), and the firm chooses the
employment level Lt(wT , x). Which regime prevails depends on the fee x for temporary
workers relative to two threshold values x and x, with x < x, as depicted in Figure 2.1.
If x ≥ x, the labor union will choose the wage-setting regime R. For x < x, the regime T
will be chosen, whereas for intermediate values of the fee, x ≤ x < x, the wage-setting
regime X will be implemented.12
x
x x¯
Regime T
x < x
w = wT
L2 = 0; L˜2 > 0
Regime X
x ≤ x < x
w = wX = x
L2 > 0; L˜2 = 0
Regime R
x ≤ x
w = wR
L2 > 0; L˜2 = 0
Figure 2.1: Three Wage-Setting Regimes for Regular Workers Depending on the Size of
the Fee for Temporary Agency Workers
Before moving on to prove these statements, the monopoly wages and corresponding
employment and utility levels for the regimes R and T are derived. As shown in Ap-
pendix 2.A.2, in these regimes each union sets the wage for regular workers as a mark-up
over unemployment benefits, with the mark-up depending negatively on the wage elas-
ticity of labor demand for regular workers. As has been shown in Section 2.3, the labor
demand elasticities differ depending on whether the firm uses only regular workers or also
temporary workers in production. In regime R, the rent-maximizing wage for regular
12Notice that in the wage-setting regimes R and X only regular workers are employed, i.e. the firm
chooses the employment level according to the Lr(w) function. The indices r and t just distinguish the
labor demand functions and have a different meaning than the indices for the wage-setting regimes R,
X, and T .
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workers claimed by the labor union is
wR =
1
(α + β)κ
φb, (2.21)
leading to the employment level Lr(wR) determined by eq. (2.15). The labor union then
achieves the utility level
VR = Lr(wR) (1− τw) (wR − φb). (2.22)
In regime T , the rent-maximizing wage for regular workers becomes
wT =
1− βκ
ακ
φb, (2.23)
leading to the employment level Lt(wT , x) determined by eq. (2.19). Interestingly, it turns
out that wT > wR. If the firm uses temporary agency work, the union’s wage claim for
the remaining regular workers is higher than the rent-maximizing wage if only regular
workers are employed. The reason is that the labor demand elasticity for regular workers
is lower (in absolute values) if also temporary workers are employed. In regime T , the
labor union achieves the economic rent
VT (x) = Lt(wT , x) (1− τw) (wT − φb). (2.24)
As can be seen from this equation, the monopoly rent in regime T is a function of the
fee for temporary workers. While wT is constant, labor demand Lt(·) for regular workers
negatively depends on the fee x. As a consequence, VT also negatively depends on x.
An intuition for the determination of the threshold values x and x and the separation
of the different wage-setting regimes is most easily obtained by looking at Figure 2.2 that
describes the labor market for regular workers. The curve Lr(w) represents labor demand
in case only regular workers are employed in the production of both segments, whereas
Lt(w, x) is the labor demand curve (for regular workers) if temporary workers are used
for the production of the S2-segment. Notice that a decline in x leads to a rightward shift
of the Lt-curve.
If x ≥ wR, i.e. the fee for temporary workers is higher than or equal to the wage wR,
the labor union chooses the wage w = wR that maximizes its economic rent if only regular
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workers are employed, and the firm decides to employ only regular workers (point A). The
upper threshold for x therefore is
x ≡ wR = 1
(α + β)κ
φb. (2.25)
L
w
Lt(w, x) Lr(w)Lt(w, x)
VT (x) = VX(x)
E
B
VR
A
VX(x)
VT (x)
wT
Lt(wT , x)
wR = x
Dx
Lr(x)
CwX = x
Figure 2.2: The Determination of the Threshold Values x and x
Now suppose that the fee x for temporary workers is somewhat below x. If the labor
union still claimed the wage wR, the firm would decide to employ temporary workers for
the production of S2, because x < wR. In Figure 2.2, the corresponding labor demand
curve (for regular workers) is depicted as the dashed line Lt(w, x). If the labor union
chooses a wage rate w > x, the firm chooses employment according to this Lt(w, x)-curve.
Along this curve, the rent-maximizing wage is given by wT , leading to the employment
level Lt(wT , x) (point B). As is evident from the figure, in this situation the labor union
would be better off by instead choosing a wage wX = x that makes the firm to employ
only regular workers (point C). The reason is that the corresponding economic rent
VX(x) = Lr(x)(1− τw)(x− φb) (2.26)
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is higher than the utility level VT (x) corresponding to the indifference curve tangent to
the Lt(w, x)-curve in point B.
If the fee for temporary workers further declines, the Lt(w, x)-curve and the indiffer-
ence curve representing the maximum level of economic rent in regime T shift to the right
due to the complementarities in production mentioned in Section 2.3. Simultaneously,
with decreasing x the economic rent achievable in regime X declines and the correspond-
ing indifference curve shifts to the left. As depicted in Figure 2.2, there has to exist a
lower threshold x defined as the wage level for regular workers that renders the labor
union indifferent between the situation in which only regular workers are used (point D)
and the situation in which temporary workers replace regular workers in the production of
segment S2 (point E). The labor demand curve in the latter situation is given by Lt(w, x).
Hence, x is implicitly defined by the condition
VT (x) = VX(x). (2.27)
If x < x, the Lt(w, x)-curve lies to the right of the Lt(w, x)-curve. Hence, it no longer
pays off for the labor union to prevent the employment of temporary workers because in
this case VX(x) < VT (x).
The graphical analysis using Figure 2.2 suggests that a lower threshold x < x exists,
where x = wR. Since the graphical results depend on the position of the Lt(w, x)-curves
relative to the Lr(w)-curve, it has to be shown that the graphical intuition is correct.
The formal proof, outlined in more detail in Appendix 2.A.3, is based on the following
reasoning:
1. To determine the upper threshold x, it is shown that for all values of the fee x
with x ≥ wR it is optimal for the labor union to claim the wage w = wR. The alternative
strategy of choosing a wage w > x, thereby inducing the firm to employ temporary
workers for the production of segment S2, is not in the interest of the labor union.
13 This
is demonstrated by noting that for x = wR it holds that VR > VT (wR). In other words,
the wage-employment combination (wR, Lr(wR)) leads to a higher economic rent than the
13Note that for fees x > wR it can never be optimal to choose a wage w with wR < w < x, because wR
is the rent-maximizing wage if only regular workers are employed.
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combination (wT , Lt(wT , x = wR)). Moreover, because ∂VT (x)/∂x < 0, it must also hold
that VR > VT (x) for all x > wR. It can be concluded that for x ≥ wR, the R-regime
prevails in which it is the best strategy for the labor union to claim the wage wR, and for
the firm to employ only regular workers.
2. It has already been noted in step 1 that VR > VT (wR). Because of eqs. (2.22) and
(2.26), it also holds that VR = VX(wR). It can therefore be concluded that VX(wR) −
VT (wR) > 0. Moreover, it can be shown that ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR.
In other words, the difference between the economic rents in regimes X and T declines
with a decline in x. However, at least for marginal declines in x, it still holds that
VX(x) > VT (x). This means that if x (marginally) declines below wR, it is better to set
the wage equal to the fee of temporary workers (X-regime) in order to prevent temporary
agency employment (T -regime). From steps 1 and 2 it follows that x = wR indeed
constitutes the upper threshold for the fee x. For x ≥ x the R-regime prevails, whereas
for (at least marginally) lower values than x the X-regime is chosen.
3. Since VX(wR) − VT (wR) > 0 and ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR, with
declining x eventually a level x is reached where VX(x) = VT (x). If x were lower than the
lowest admissible value of fee x, denoted xmin and defined as xmin = φb, regime T would
never occur.14 However, it is shown that xmin < x and VX(x) − VT (x) < 0 for all x with
xmin ≤ x < x. Hence, x constitutes the lower threshold separating regimes X and T .
2.5 Comparison of the Different Wage-Setting
Regimes
This section compares the levels of wages, employment, labor union’s utilities, and firm’s
profits for the three wage-setting regimes defined in Section 2.4. Starting with the com-
parison of the wage levels, it immediately follows from the discussion in Section 2.4 that
wT > wR > wX , (2.28)
14As has been outlined in Section 2, x = (φ b + s)/δ. The minimum value for x is obtained for δ = 1
and s = 0, leading to xmin = φb.
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where wX represents all wages wX = x for x ∈ [x, x). The first inequality is due the
lower wage elasticity of labor demand for regular workers in regime T in comparison to
regime R. Hence, in the employment regime with temporary workers, the optimal wage
wT is higher than the monopoly wage wR when only regular workers are employed. The
second inequality results from the union’s incentive to undercut the wage wR to prevent
temporary agency employment if x ≤ x < x.
Regarding the labor union’s utility, it follows from the determination of the threshold
values x and x in Section 2.4 that
VR > VX(x) > VT (x) for x > x. (2.29)
From that discussion it is also evident that VT (x) > VX(x) if x < x and that VT (x)
increases with declining x. An interesting question left to answer is whether for values
of x with xmin < x < x it could be possible that VT (x) > VR. This would mean that
labor unions profit from the employment of (relatively cheap) temporary workers because
of higher economic rents. However, in Appendix 2.A.4 it is shown that, at least in our
model, this result cannot occur. Instead, we conclude that
VR > VT (x) for x ≥ xmin = φ b. (2.30)
Hence, labor unions are always harmed by the employment of temporary workers.
Since in regimes R and X the same labor demand function is relevant and wX <
wR, it immediately follows that employment in regime X is higher than employment in
regime R. Moreover, it also holds that employment in regime R is higher than employment
in regime T . If this were not the case, we would get a situation in which both wages and
employment of regular workers are higher in regime T than in regime R. This, however,
would contradict the inequality in eq. (2.30). Therefore,
Lr(wX) > Lr(wR) > Lt(wT , x), (2.31)
where wX again refers to wages wX = x in the interval x ∈ [x, x) that are chosen in
regime X. Note that the second inequality not only holds for x ∈ [xmin, x), but for all
x ≥ xmin. In Appendix 2.A.5 it is explicitly shown that inequality (2.31) holds.
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Finally, the firm’s profits in the different regimes are considered (for details see Ap-
pendix 2.A.5). It can easily be derived that piX(x) > piT (x) and piX(x) > piR for all
x ≥ xmin. However, whether profits in regime T exceed profits in regime R or vice versa,
depends on the values of the exogenous parameters α, β, and κ. In Appendix 2.A.5 it
is shown that there exists a value x > xmin, denoted xindiff, for which piR = piT (xindiff).
The location of xindiff depends on the parameter values of α, β, and κ. If xindiff ∈ [x, x),
profits in regime T are higher than in regime R, i.e. it then holds that piT (x) > piR for
x ∈ [xmin, x). It can be shown that the probability for this situation is the higher, the
smaller κ and the higher β relative to α. In other words, the larger the share of segment
S2 in production and the higher its share in total labor costs, the higher is the incentive
of firms to hire temporary agency workers in the production of that segment to reduce
labor costs and increase profits. However, if xindiff ∈ [xmin, x), there is a range of fees
for temporary workers (xindiff, x) for which piT (x) < piR. It may seem puzzling that firms
would employ temporary workers in such a situation though this implies lower profits
than in the regime where only regular workers are employed (at the monopoly wage wR).
The explanation is as follows: According to our analysis, the labor union finds it no longer
profitable to prevent temporary agency employment if x < x. The labor union therefore
demands a wage wT for the remaining regular workers and the firm finds it optimal to
replace regular workers in segment S2 by temporary workers. Both, the firm and the labor
union, would be better off if the firm would only employ regular workers in both segments
at the monopoly wage wR. However, if the labor union claims the wage wR, the firm still
has the incentive to deviate from such an agreement and to replace the regular workers
in segment S2 by temporary workers, since x < x < wR. In such a case, the labor union
would be even worse off than in a situation in which it claims the higher wage wT for the
remaining regular workers.
2.6 A Model Variant for a Small Open Economy
The model outlined above also describes the general equilibrium for a small open econ-
omy. In a small open economy goods prices are determined in world markets. Since the
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representative firm faces an infinitely elastic demand curve at world prices, the parame-
ter κ introduced in eq. (2.11) equals 1. To obtain well defined labor demand functions it
must be assumed that α+ β < 1 in eq. (2.1). Instead of eqs. (2.16) and (2.20), the labor
demand elasticities now become
εr =
1
1− (α + β) and εt =
1− β
1− (α + β) .
With these labor demand elasticities, the monopoly wages in regimes R and T can be
computed as
wR =
1
α + β
φb and wT =
1− β
α
φb, (2.32)
where again wT > wR holds. The rest of the analysis remains unchanged, i.e. there
exist again the three regimes R, X, and T separated by the threshold values x and x as
outlined in the closed economy version of the model. Therefore, our conclusions also hold
in a general equilibrium setting for a small open economy.
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter develops a theoretical model to analyze how the firms’ option to employ
temporary agency workers affects the wage-setting behavior of labor unions. In the model,
the motive behind employing temporary agency workers is the reduction in costs when
the fee for temporary workers is lower than the wage for regular workers. The theoretical
predictions are derived using two modeling frameworks: the partial equilibrium in a closed
economy with monopolistic competition in goods markets and the general equilibrium in a
small open economy where goods prices are determined by world markets. For simplicity,
in the model monopoly unions are assumed that by their very nature have the highest
wage-setting power.
It is shown that, depending on the fee for temporary workers, unions may try to
prevent the implementation of temporary agency work by deviating from the monopoly
wage and accepting lower wages. In this case, firms are able to use the option to replace
regular workers by temporary workers as a threat against unions, thereby lowering wage
demands and increasing profits. Unions then only claim wages that are equal to the fee
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the firm would have to pay for temporary workers. As a consequence, the firms’ option
to use agency workers may affect wage setting also in those firms that do not employ
temporary agency workers. This is an important result for at least two reasons. First,
empirical studies may come to wrong conclusions if they try to identify the wage effects
of temporary agency work by comparing wage levels for regular workers in firms with and
without temporary agency work. Second, though the share of agency workers in the total
workforce is relatively small in many OECD countries, the impact of temporary agency
work on the wage-setting process may be much larger.
It is also shown that if the fee for temporary workers is below a specific lower threshold,
it is no longer the optimal strategy for labor unions to prevent the employment of tem-
porary agency workers. Interestingly, since firms reduce the number of regular workers,
it now is the best strategy for labor unions to claim wages that are even higher than the
wage demands when the firms’ threat to replace regular workers is not credible. Hence,
according to our model, the intensive use of temporary agency workers in high-wage firms
may be the cause and not the consequence of the high wage level in those firms.
In the literature it is sometimes argued that the use of temporary agency work may
also benefit labor unions because they would be able to appropriate higher economic rents.
It would then be in the interest of unions not to resist the employment of agency workers.
However, at least in the present model, labor unions are always harmed by the firms’
option to employ temporary workers.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Right-to-Manage Versus Efficient Bargaining
Empirical studies lack a clear answer about whether the right-to-manage model or the
efficient bargaining model is more relevant. If managers are asked about the issues covered
in bargains with labor unions, the answers seem to unambiguously back up the right-to-
manage model (Booth, 1995). This can be most clearly seen in the U.S., where many
collective agreements explicitly stipulate that employers retain the right to determine the
level of employment. Even in countries where such a stipulation is not explicitly found in
employment contracts, one gets the impression that labor unions typically do not bargain
over employment.
Some economists argued that bargaining over employment implicitly occurs through
firm-union agreements on “manning” levels (by which capital-to-labor or labor-to-output
ratios are meant).15 However, it is not clear why agreements on manning levels should be
interpreted as contracts which implicitly determine the employment level. The reason is
that, for instance, a fixed capital-labor ratio does not prevent firms from adjusting both
capital and employment, or changing the number of shifts per machine (Layard et al.,
1991, p. 96).
It is sometimes claimed that empirical studies which do not rely on survey data but
focus on market outcomes would support the hypothesis that efficient bargains do, at least
implicitly, occur (see, for example, Brown & Ashenfelter, 1986). However, Booth (1995,
chap. 5) convincingly argues that the tests applied in these studies in order to distinguish
between the right-to-manage model and the efficient bargaining model are flawed and
therefore not credible. Empirical studies trying to identify the appropriate bargaining
model from observed market outcomes are confronted with almost unsurmountable diffi-
culties. In principle, each study has to make assumptions about labor unions’ preferences,
technologies, other labor market imperfections, and the market structure. The empirical
tests then are joint tests of these assumptions. For example, the shape of the contract
curve depends on the preferences of union members and may even coincide with the labor
15For this discussion see, e.g., McDonald & Solow (1981), Johnson (1990) and Clark (1990).
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demand curve.16 Hence, even if one focuses on the efficient bargaining model, different re-
sults are possible depending on labor union’s preferences. The critique goes farther than
that, since empirical studies have failed to significantly improve our knowledge about
labor unions’ preferences (see, for example, Pencavel, 1991).
The fact that efficient bargains are not observed more frequently may be due to the
fact that something important is missing in theoretical considerations which claim the
superiority of wage-employment bargains. For instance, efficient bargains may not be
enforceable. Since the bargaining outcome usually lies off the labor demand curve, the
firm has an incentive to cheat and may try to increase profits at the bargained wage level
by choosing employment according to its labor demand curve. If labor unions are unable
to enforce the labor contract, they may prefer higher wages and lower employment as
predicted by the right-to-manage model.17 For all these reasons, we consider the right-
to-manage model to be a plausible framework for studying the impact of labor unions on
labor market outcomes.
2.A.2 Utility Maximization of the Labor Union
In the wage-setting regimes R and T , the representative labor union chooses the optimal
wage wR and wT by maximizing its objective function (2.9) subject to the labor demand
function Lr(w) or Lt(w, x) defined in eqs. (2.15) and (2.19), respectively. From the first-
order condition it follows that
−∂Lr
∂w
wR
Lr
=
wR
wR − φ b and −
∂Lt
∂w
wT
Lt
=
wT
wT − φ b
for the R-regime and T -regime, respectively. Therefore,
wR =
εr
εr − 1φ b and wT =
εt
εt − 1φ b,
16See, for example, the “insider model” of Carruth & Oswald (1987) and the “seniority wage model”
of Oswald (1993).
17If uncertainty and asymmetric information with respect to the future level of the firm’s goods demand
are taken into account, the scope of incentive-compatible contracts may be severely limited due to the
costs of information gathering and the problems associated with moral hazard.
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where εr and εt are defined in eqs. (2.16) and (2.20), respectively. If the tax rate for
unemployment benefits is lower than that for wages, φ > 1 holds, whereas φ = 1 if the
tax rate for unemployment benefits and wages is the same. In the case of the R-regime,
the second-order condition for a utility maximum is
(1− τw)
[
(wR − φ b) · ∂
2Lr
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
+ 2 · ∂Lr
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
]
< 0.
Since
∂Lr
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
= −εr · Lr(wR)
wR
, and
∂2Lr
∂w2
∣∣∣∣
w=wR
=
εr
w2R
· Lr(wR) · (1 + εr),
it can be shown that the second-order condition for a the utility maximum holds because
−Lr · εr
w2R
· φ b < 0.
A similar reasoning applies to the second-order condition in the T -regime.
2.A.3 Determination of the Wage-Setting Regimes
This appendix provides the details for the proof outlined in Section 2.4.
1. It is first shown that VR > VT (wR). Inserting the labor demand function Lr(·) from
eq. (2.15) into the expression for VR in eq. (2.22), one obtains
VR = (A1 + A2)w
−1
1−κ(α+β)
R (1− τw)(wR − φb).
Similarly, inserting Lt(·) from eq. (2.19) into the expression for VT in eq. (2.24) for x = wR
leads to
VT (wT ) = A1[w
−(1−βκ)
T w
−βκ
R ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (1− τw)(wT − φb).
Hence, for VR > VT (wR) it must hold that
A1
A1 + A2
· wT − φb
wR − φb <
[
w−1R
w
−(1−βκ)
T w
−βκ
R
] 1
1−κ(α+β)
. (2.33)
Because of the definition of A1 and A2 in eq. (2.14) and the definitions of wR and wT in
eqs. (2.21) and (2.23), the LHS of this inequality is
A1
A1 + A2
· wT − φb
wR − φb =
α
α + β
· α + β
α
= 1. (2.34)
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Hence, inequality (2.33) becomes
1 <
[
wT
wR
] 1−βκ
1−κ(α+β)
,
leading to wT > wR. Since the last inequality is true, also VR > VT (wR) holds.
As next step the derivative of VT (x) is computed. One obtains
∂VT (x)
∂x
= − βκ
1− κ(α + β)
VT (x)
x
< 0.
If these results are taken together, it can be concluded that for all fees x ≥ wR, the R-
regime prevails in which it is the best strategy for the labor union to claim the wage wR,
and for the firm to employ only regular workers.
2. Using eqs. (2.24) and (2.26) for VT and VX , respectively, and taking account of
the labor demand functions (2.17) and (2.19), the difference in the rents achievable in
regimes X and T is
VX(x)− VT (x) = (1− τw)·[
(A1 + A2)x
− 1
1−κ(α+β) (x− φb)− A1 [x−βκw−(1−βκ)T ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (wT − φb)
]
,
and its derivative with respect to fee x is
∂[VX(x)− VT (x)]
∂x
= (1− τw)·[
(A1 + A2)x
− 1
1−κ(α+β)
(
1− 1
1− κ(α + β)
x− φb
x
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡C
+
βκ
1− κ(α + β) A1 (x
−βκw−(1−βκ)T )
1
1−κ(α+β)x−1(wT − φb)
]
The term C is positive if
x <
1
κ(α + β)
φb = wR,
and it is zero if x = wR. Hence, x ≤ wR is sufficient for ∂[VX(x)−VT (x)]/∂x > 0 to hold.
As has been explained in Section 2.4, it follows from points 1 and 2 that x = wR
indeed constitutes the upper threshold for the fee x. For x ≥ x the R-regime prevails,
whereas for (at least marginally) lower values than x, the X-regime is chosen.
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3. Since VX(wR) − VT (wR) > 0 and ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 for x ≤ wR, with
declining x eventually a level x is reached where VX(x) = VT (x), implying
(A1 + A2)x
−1
1−κ(α+β) (x− φ b) = A1
[
w
−(1−βκ)
T x
−βκ] 11−κ(α+β) (wT − φ b).
Rearrangement leads to the following expression which implicitly defines x:
α
α + β
(
wT
x
) −(1−βκ)
1−κ(α+β)
=
x− φ b
wT − φ b.
Theoretically, it may be possible that x is lower than the lowest admissible value of fee x,
denoted xmin, where xmin = φb. This would mean regime T never to occur. However, it
can be shown that for xmin the difference in the utilities in regimes X and T is negative:
VX(xmin)− VT (xmin) = Lr(xmin)(1− τw)(φ b− φ b)− Lt(xmin)(1− τw)(wT − φ b)
= −Lt(xmin)(1− τw)(wT − φ b) < 0.
As ∂[VX(x) − VT (x)]/∂x > 0 and VX(x) − VT (x) = 0, it holds that xmin < x. Hence,
regime T is a possible outcome of the model and x constitutes the lower threshold sepa-
rating regimes X and T .
2.A.4 Proof for VR > VT (x) for x > xmin
Since VT (x) increases with declining x, it could be the case that for very low x the
inequality VT (x) > VR holds. In terms of Figure 2.2 this would mean that for a very low
fee x the LT (x)-curve may lie far enough to the right that the corresponding economic
rent in regime T is higher than the economic rent achievable in regime R. However, it
can be shown that in our model such a case cannot occur. To do so, it has to be shown
that the highest achievable economic rent in regime T is lower than the rent achievable in
regime R. Since ∂VT (x)/∂x < 0, the highest value of VT is obtained at VT (xmin), where
xmin = φ b. In the following, we will show that
VT (xmin) < VR (2.35)
holds. Taking account of the definition of the utility functions in eqs. (2.22) and (2.24)
and the labor demand functions in eqs. (2.15) and (2.19), this condition is met if
A1
A1 + A2
· wT − φb
wR − φb <
[
w
(1−βκ)
T (φ b)
βκ
wR
] 1
1−κ(α+β)
. (2.36)
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Because of eq. (2.34), the LHS of this inequality is equal to one. Taking account of the
definitions of wR and wT in eqs. (2.21) and (2.23), rearrangement of inequality (2.36)
leads to
κ(α + β)
(
1− βκ
ακ
)(1−βκ)
> 1. (2.37)
To show that this inequality is fulfilled, we set α + β = z with z ≤ 1. In the following,
the cases z = 1 and z < 1 are considered separately.
Case 1: z = 1. Since in this case α = 1− β, the LHS of inequality (2.37) becomes
f := κ
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ
(2.38)
It must be shown that f is greater than one for all admissible values of β and κ. Because
of the sign of the partial derivatives,18
∂f
∂β
= κ2
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ[
1− βκ
(1− β)κ − ln
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)
− 1
]
> 0,
∂f
∂κ
= −
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)1−βκ[
1 + βκ ln
(
1− βκ
(1− β)κ
)]
< 0,
the lowest admissible values of β and the highest admissible values of κmust be considered.
Since it holds that limκ→1 f = 1 and limβ→0 f = 1, f is indeed greater than one for all
admissible values of κ and β. Hence, VR > VT (x) for all admissible values of the fee for
temporary workers (x ≥ xmin) in the case α + β = 1.
Case 2: z < 1. Since in this case α = z − β, the LHS of inequality (2.37) becomes
h := z κ
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ
(2.39)
18For the first derivative to be positive, the term in corner brackets has to be positive. In general it holds
that y−ln(y) > 1 for expression y being positive and unequal to one. As expression (1−βκ)/((1−β)κ) > 1,
the term in brackets is indeed positive.
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It must be shown that h is greater than one for all admissible values of β and κ. Because
of the sign of the partial derivatives,
∂h
∂κ
= −κzβ
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ
ln
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)
< 0,
∂h
∂β
= zκ2
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)1−βκ[
1− βκ
(z − β)κ − ln
(
1− βκ
(z − β)κ
)
− 1
]
> 0,
the lowest admissible values of β and the highest admissible values of κmust be considered.
It holds that
lim
κ→1
h = z
(
1− β
z − β
)1−β
.
In order to check whether this expression is still greater than one if β gets very small, we
compute
lim
β→0
(
lim
κ→1
h
)
=
1
z
· z = 1.
Therefore, h is indeed greater than one for all admissible values of κ and β. Hence,
VR > VT (x) for all admissible values of the fee for temporary workers (x ≥ xmin) in the
case α + β < 1.
Taken together, VR > VT (x) for all admissible parameter values and x ≥ xmin.
2.A.5 Comparison of Labor Demand and Profits in the Different
Regimes
As has been explained in Section 2.5, employment in regime X is greater than employment
in regime R because wX < wR. It is now shown that employment in regime R is greater
than employment in regime T . Using eqs. (2.15), (2.19), (2.21), and (2.23), it turns out
that employment in regime R is greater than that in regime T if(
α
α + β
)1−κ(α+β)
< κ(α + β)
(
1− βκ
ακ
)(1−βκ)
. (2.40)
The RHS of this inequality is greater than one because of inequality (2.37). Since the
LHS is smaller than one, the condition is met.
Using eqs. (2.11), (2.12), (2.13), (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19), maximum profits in the
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different regimes are
piR = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · w
− κ(α+β)
1−κ(α+β)
R (2.41)
piT (x) = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · [w−ακT x−βκ]
1
1−κ(α+β) (2.42)
piX(x) = [A
ακ
1 A
βκ
2 − (A1 + A2)] · x−
κ(α+β)
1−κ(α+β) (2.43)
It is easy to verify that piX(x) > piT (x) and piX(x) > piR for all x ∈ [xmin, x] as for this
range of x it holds that wT > x and wR > x, respectively. However, it is left to show
whether in regime T firms earn higher profits than in regime R. Using eqs. (2.41) and
(2.42), the value of x that renders the firm indifferent between both regimes, i.e. for which
piR = piT (xindiff), is
xindiff = wR
(
wR
wT
)α
β
(2.44)
Obviously xindiff < wR, because wR/wT < 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that xindiff is
greater than xmin. For this, using eq. (2.44) and xmin = φ b, it has to hold that
κ(α + β)
[
κ(α + β)
1− βκ
ακ
]α
β
< 1. (2.45)
Setting α + β = z with z ≤ 1, the LHS of inequality (2.45) becomes
l := z κ
(
z
1− βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
. (2.46)
It must be shown that l is smaller than one for all admissible values of β and κ. The
partial derivatives of l are
∂l
∂κ
= z
(
z
1− βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
·
[
1− κ(z − β)
1− βκ
]
> 0
and
∂l
∂β
= z κ
(
z
1− βκ
z − β
) z−β
β
·
[
− z
β2
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
+
(1− βκ)− κ(z − β)
β(1− βκ)
]
.
It will turn out that l decreases in β. For this to be the case, the expression in corner
brackets has to be negative, or, alternatively written,
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
− β(1− βκ)− βκ(z − β)
(1− βκ)z > 0.
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Expanding the second term of the LHS, the inequality can be written as
ln
(
(1− βκ)z
z − β
)
+
z − β
(1− βκ)z > 1,
which is fulfilled because (ln y + 1/y) > 1 for y 6= 1.
As l increases in κ and decreases in β, the highest admissible value of κ and the lowest
admissible value of β must be considered to make sure that inequality (2.45) is fulfilled.
Since the limits are19
lim
κ→1
l = z
(
z
1− β
z − β
) z−β
β
< 1 and lim
β→0
l =
e κ z
eκ z
< 1, (2.47)
function l is indeed smaller than one for all admissible values of κ and β and, hence, xindiff
is greater than xmin.
It is still left to show where xindiff is located compared to x, i.e. whether xindiff is smaller
than, equal to, or greater than x. This question cannot be answered by just comparing
xindiff and x directly, because x is only implicitly defined. However, Section 2.4 discussed
that for x ∈ [xmin, x) the economic rent VT (x) exceeds VX(x) whereas for x ∈ [x, x) the
opposite holds. This information can be used to identify the location of xindiff. If for
VT (x) and VX(x) evaluated at xindiff the economic rent in regime T exceeds the rent in
regime X, xindiff lies in the interval [xmin, x). In the opposite case xindiff lies in the interval
[x, x). With the definitions of VT and VX in eqs. (2.24) and (2.26) and the corresponding
labor demand functions (2.17) and (2.19), the utility levels are
VX(xindiff) = (A1 + A2)
[(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR
]− 1
1−κ(α+β)
(1− τw)
[(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR − φb
]
(2.48)
VT (xindiff) = A1
[
w1−βκT
(
wR
wT
)ακ
wβκR
]− 1
1−κ(α+β)
(1− τw) [wT − φb] (2.49)
Using these equations, it turns out that xindiff ∈ [x, x) or rather VX(xindiff) > VT (xindiff) if
(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR
w
(1−βκ)
T
(
wR
wT
)ακ
wβκR

− 1
1−κ(α+β)
>
A1
A1 + A2
· wT − φb(
wR
wT
)α
β
wR − φb
. (2.50)
19Note that for z = 1, limκ→1 l = 1. For z < 1, limκ→1 l ≤ 1 as limβ→0 (limκ→1 l) = e z/ez ≤ 1.
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Because of eq. (2.34) it holds that A1/(A1 +A2) = α/(α+ β) and wT − φb = (wR − φb) ·
(α + β)/α. Therefore, eq. (2.50) becomes(
wT
wR
) [1−κ(α+β)]βκ+ακ
[1−κ(α+β)]βκ
>
wR − φb(
wR
wT
)ακ
βκ
wR − φb
. (2.51)
However, calibration of inequality (2.51) shows that there are combinations of admissible
parameter values possible for which this inequality is violated. This means that for some
admissible combinations of α, β, and κ it holds that xindiff < x, whereas for other param-
eter combinations xindiff > x. Setting α + β = z with z ≤ 1, it turns out that the smaller
κ and the higher β compared to α, the higher is the probability that xindiff ∈ [x, x).
Whether firms benefit from using temporary agency employment compared to using
regular workers only, depends on the location of xindiff. For x ∈ [xmin, x), labor unions
claim wage wT and regime T occurs. If, additionally, xindiff ∈ [x, x), then the firm’s
profit in regime T unambiguously exceeds the profit achievable in regime R. If, however,
xindiff ∈ [xmin, x), there is a range of fees for temporary workers (xindiff, x) for which
piT (x) < piR.
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Chapter 3
Deregulation of Temporary Agency
Employment in a Unionized
Economy: Does This Really Lead to
a Substitution of Regular
Employment?∗
3.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the use of temporary agency work increased tremendously in
almost all OECD countries. In Germany, for example, the number of temporary agency
workers increased sevenfold (Jahn & Weber, 2016). With a share of temporary agency
employment on overall employment of just about 2% in most industrialized countries,
temporary agency employment may seem to be rather small and, therefore, to be a mi-
nor labor market issue at first sight. However, the deregulation of temporary agency
employment is an important, frequently used and highly discussed labor market policy
issue in Europe. There has been ongoing institutional deregulation of temporary agency
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Dario Cords and has appeared as Baudy & Cords (2016).
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employment aiming at increasing flexibility of the countries’ labor markets. For instance,
in Germany the deregulation of temporary agency employment was part of the labor mar-
ket reform “Agenda 2010” of the former social-democratic chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der in
2003. The aim of increasing the attractiveness of temporary agency employment was, next
to other labor market instruments, to reduce unemployment and to increase the interna-
tional competitiveness of the German economy. The political idea behind the deregulation
of temporary agency employment is to bring more people to work that are not able to
find a job in the regular labor market, e.g. long-term unemployed. By using temporary
workers in the production, firms may “test” the workers and, afterwards, convert their
employment relationship to regular employment. From the firm’s perspective, there are
various motives for using temporary agency workers in the production process (see, e.g.,
Holst et al., 2010). One of them is that using temporary agency workers in the production
allows to easily adjust the workforce to uncertainty about future output levels, workforce
fluctuations, worker absence etc. since temporary agency workers are not covered by
employment protection (see Houseman, 2001; Ono & Sullivan, 2013). Another argument
for replacing regular by temporary workers is that the use of the latter may lead to cost
savings and increasing profits (see, e.g., Jahn & Weber, 2016).
In most European countries, wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements
between firms and labor unions. The use of temporary agency employment may lead to
a substitution of part of the regular workforce that is represented by the unions. Thus,
labor unions have to take the behavior of the employment agencies into account in the
negotiation process. Otherwise, the increasing attractiveness for firms to use temporary
agency work may induce a substantial replacement of regular employment and, hence,
deteriorate the labor unions’ position in the economy.
Despite the important role of labor unions in almost all European economies, up to now
there has been limited attention on the investigation of temporary agency employment
on labor union’s behavior. Beissinger & Baudy (2015) give a first theoretical contribution
analyzing the firm’s strategic use of potential temporary agency employment in the wage-
setting process to dampen labor union’s wage claims. However, the model neglects the
general equilibrium effects of increasing temporary agency employment. Therefore, it is
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not able to cope with the main argument of opponents of temporary agency work that
the ongoing transition to more flexible labor markets leads to a change in the employment
structure towards more precarious employment and a decrease in union coverage. Thus,
it is left to analyze the effects of temporary agency work on overall employment and the
employment structure in the economy in a dynamic setup.
To close this gap, the present chapter analyzes the general equilibrium effects of tem-
porary agency employment in a frictional labor market a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (2000). It is assumed that there are large firms producing differentiated
goods with labor being the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly
by the firms or, alternatively, the firm may borrow workers from temporary employment
agencies. Both types of work are modeled as perfect substitutes. Regular workers are orga-
nized in firm-level labor unions. Agencies are small (one worker) and bargain individually
with the firm over the fee a firm has to pay for using temporary workers in its production.
This model framework enables to reveal the employment structure in the economy and
its adjustment to shocks like institutional changes in the regulation of temporary work
agencies. Furthermore, it is possible to analyze how union coverage evolves in the econ-
omy and to examine the flows in the different labor market states. Legal (de)regulation is
modeled by regulatory costs arising from institutional barriers like limitations regarding
the maximum period of assignment of temporary workers, re-employment bans, synchro-
nization bans or equal pay obligations for regular and temporary agency workers. Higher
legal regulation leads to increasing regulatory costs.
The main result of the model is that there is a hump-shaped relationship between
temporary agency employment used in the production and its degree of legal deregulation.
At first sight, this may be counterintuitive as it means that progressive legal deregulation
does not inevitably lead to an increase in temporary agency employment but it may even
decline. Furthermore, regular employment monotonically increases in the deregulation of
temporary employment. Thus, there is no reduction in the degree of union coverage but,
on the contrary, it even increases. Unions and single workers both suffer from temporary
agency employment due to declining wage rates and labor union utility. The findings
reject the main argument of opponents of temporary agency employment and support the
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policy makers’ idea that legal deregulation of temporary agency employment increases
the flexibility of the European labor markets and brings people to work who may not find
regular employment. The model supports the deregulation efforts of temporary agency
employment in order to increase the employment level.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief discussion of related
literature on labor unions and temporary agency employment. Section 3.3 describes the
outline of the model and its components in more detail before the model is solved in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 defines the equilibrium. In Section 3.6, the model is calibrated
and its predictions considering the employment structure in the economy are presented.
Section 3.7 examines the key insights of the model, i.e. the changes in the wage setting and
the employment structure triggered by legal deregulation of the temporary employment
sector. Finally, Section 3.8 summarizes the results and concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The behavior of labor unions has already been widely discussed in the literature (for an
overview see Booth, 1995; Boeri et al., 2001; Addison & Schnabel, 2003). However, little
attention was paid on modeling unionized labor markets in the framework of search and
matching for a long time. A first contribution to labor unions in the matching framework
is given by Delacroix (2006). He introduces a multisectorial model with a varying degree
of union coverage and monopolistic competition in the goods market and investigates the
union’s reaction to changes in the unemployment insurance. Based on this framework,
Ebell & Haefke (2006) study the effect of a product market deregulation on the formation
of labor unions by endogenizing the choice of the bargaining institution. Bauer & Lingens
(2013) investigate the efficiency in search models with large firms and collectively bar-
gained wages, while Krusell & Rudanko (2016) analyze the intertemporal effect of unions’
commitment to future wages. In another recent contribution, Ranjan (2013) examines
the general equilibrium effects of decreasing offshoring costs in a unionized economy. He
identifies a non-monotonic relationship of unemployment and offshoring costs in the do-
mestic, offshoring country. Decreasing costs of offshoring increase unemployment first,
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but a further reduction leads to a decrease in unemployment afterwards.
Theoretical work on temporary agency employment is rather limited. The very first
theoretical contributions are given by Autor (2001, 2003). While his first paper investi-
gates the role of employment agencies in the screening for regular jobs, the latter describes
that firms relinquish to substitute the whole workforce by temporary agency employment
due to distinct capital investments related to specific workers. The first contribution to
temporary agency employment in the framework of search and matching is provided by
Neugart & Storrie (2006). The authors analyze the increase of temporary agency em-
ployment based on an improved matching efficiency that is induced by temporary work
agencies acting as intermediaries in the matching process of workers and firms. Baumann
et al. (2011) use the same framework and enrich the model setup by endogenous job de-
struction. However, the majority of research on temporary agency employment is based
on its empirical investigation and focuses on its strategic use in the production (see, e.g.,
Vidal & Tigges, 2009; Holst et al., 2010), its effect on the employment structure (Jahn
& Bentzen, 2012; Haller & Jahn, 2014), the wage differential of temporary agency work
(Garz, 2013) and the question if temporary agency employment may be used as a stepping
stone to regular employment (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008; Kvasnicka, 2009; Autor
& Houseman, 2005, 2010; Jahn & Rosholm, 2013, 2014).
3.3 Outline of the Model
3.3.1 Labor Market Flows
All workers are assumed to be identical. Following Neugart & Storrie (2006), the workforce
is segmented into four different groups. As in the standard matching literature, work-
ers are either unemployed (U) or directly employed at a firm (regular employment, R).
Furthermore, workers can be employed at temporary employment agencies. Temporary
employment agencies hire workers and have them in their pool (unassigned temporary
work, T ) with the aim to lend the workers to firms that use the workers in their produc-
tion (assigned temporary work, A). Unemployed workers may either find a regular job or
become unassigned temporary workers. Once in the pool of the temporary employment
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agency, the job in state T may either be destroyed to unemployment with an exogenous
rate δ or the temporary agency worker becomes assigned to a firm. Moreover, temporary
agency workers (assigned and unassigned) search on-the-job for regular employment. It
is assumed that the effectiveness of search is higher for temporary workers compared to
that of unemployed workers. This is reflected by parameters γT and γA for unassigned
and assigned temporary workers, respectively. Assigned temporary workers may find reg-
ular jobs or their current position is destroyed with the exogenous rate χ, meaning that
they fall back to state T just being in the pool of the temporary employment agency.
Employment of regular workers is destroyed to unemployment with the exogenous rate δ
which coincides with the job destruction rate of unassigned temporary jobs. It is assumed
that χ > δ. The reason is that due to its flexibility and a lack of employment protection
instruments, temporary agency employment is more affected by exogenous shocks than
regular jobs.
Workers accept the first suitable job offer they get whatever type it is and matching
of firms and workers/agencies is formally described by the matching function
Mi = M(Vi, Si). (3.1)
The matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both argu-
ments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Mi denotes the
instantaneous flow of hires for the different employment states i = T,A,R. The number of
vacancies posted in state i is denoted by Vi. The number of job-searchers in the respective
state is given by Si. Firms post vacancies for regular and assigned temporary jobs, while
temporary employment agencies only post vacancies for unassigned temporary workers.
Vacancies posted in state i are filled with the rate M(Vi, Si)/Vi ≡ m(θi), while the work-
ers’ finding rate for a job in state i is M(Vi, Si)/Si ≡ θim(θi). Variable θi ≡ Vi/Si reflects
the labor market tightness in state i. The number of job-searchers differs across the states
and, thus, labor market tightness θi has to be stated for each “submarket” separately. Un-
employed workers search for both, regular and temporary employment, while temporary
workers are allowed to search for regular employment on-the-job. Thus, there is an over-
lap in the groups searching for different types of jobs. The total number of job-searchers
for unassigned temporary agency employment equals the number of unemployed workers,
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Figure 3.1: Labor Market Flows
ST = U . Unassigned temporary workers look for assignments, SA = LT . Li denotes the
amount of employed workers in the respective state. Moreover, all workers in states U ,
T , and A search for regular jobs, i.e. SR = U + γT ·LT + γA ·LA. As temporary workers’
search effectiveness differs from the search effectiveness of unemployed workers, γT · LT
and γA · LA describe the effective number of unassigned and assigned temporary workers
looking for regular employment, respectively.1 Using the information about vacancies and
job-searchers in each submarket, it can be concluded that unemployed workers find jobs in
regular employment with rate θRm(θR), while unassigned and assigned temporary workers
find regular jobs with probabilities γT θRm(θR) and γAθRm(θR), respectively. Unemployed
workers find unassigned temporary jobs with probability θTm(θT ) and, once in the pool
of the agency, become assigned with probability θAm(θA). Figure 3.1 depicts the labor
market flows.
Using the information about the flows into and out of the different labor market states,
the instantaneous flows are represented by
L˙T = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA − θAm(θA) · LT − γT θRm(θR) · LT − δ · LT (3.2)
L˙A = m(θA) · VA − χ · LA − γAθRm(θR) · LA (3.3)
1Total labor force N is normalized to unity. Hence, U +LT +LA +LR = 1, with U , LT , LA, and LR
denoting the unemployment and employment rates, respectively.
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L˙R = m(θR) · VR − δ · LR. (3.4)
In the steady state, the in- and outflows for the different states coincide, i.e. L˙T = L˙A =
L˙R = 0. Thus, the flows can be rewritten to
2
[δ + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)] · LT = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA (3.5)
[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] · LA = m(θA) · VA (3.6)
δ · LR = m(θR) · VR. (3.7)
Similar to the employment flows, the flows into and out of unemployment are
U˙ = δ · LR + δ · LT − θTm(θT ) · U − θRm(θR) · U. (3.8)
As the change in unemployment is zero in steady state, i.e. U˙ = 0, the equilibrium
unemployment rate is formally represented by
U =
δ(LR + LT )
θTm(θT ) + θRm(θR)
. (3.9)
Note that equilibrium unemployment does not directly depend on the labor market tight-
ness in state A. The amount of assigned temporary workers only influences the structure
of employment, but not its rate. There is no direct channel from assigned temporary work
to unemployment or vice versa.
3.3.2 Goods Market
Households act as consumers in the goods market and, at the same time, as workers in
the labor market. Consumers are risk neutral in the aggregate consumption good and
have Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) preferences over a continuum of differentiated goods. The
goods demand function can be derived from the following optimization problem that the
households are facing:
max
cj,k
(∫
c
η−1
η
j,k dj
) η
η−1
with j = 0, ..., n and η > 1, (3.10)
2The flow equations given here represent the firm’s perspective. They can easily be converted to the
respective flow equations from the workers side of view. To do so, the respective job-searchers of each
state and the condition that the total labor force equals the sum of the workers of each state have to be
used. Appendix 3.A.1 provides the respective equations.
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subject to the resource constraint
Ik =
∫
cj,k ·
(
Pj
P
)
· dj, (3.11)
where j denotes the differentiated good and k denotes the household. Further, cj,k denotes
household k’s consumption of good j, while Ik is the real income of household k. Parameter
η gives the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated goods, while pj = Pj/P is
the firm’s price relative to the aggregate price level. The solution to the aforementioned
maximization problem and, thus, aggregate demand for good j is given by
Yj ≡
∫
cj,k · dk = p−ηj · I, (3.12)
with I ≡ ∫ Ik · dk being aggregate real income and P ≡ (∫ P 1−ηj ) 11−η denoting the price
index.
3.3.3 Firms
In contrast to the basic matching model of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000), the model in this chapter is dealing with large firms that employ multiple workers.
Each firm j produces a single, differentiated final good. There are two reasons for using
large firms instead of one-worker firms. First, in models of monopolistic competition the
optimal firm size and its output level are determined endogenously. Hence, restricting the
firm size to one worker conflicts with monopolistic goods market competition (for more
details see Ebell & Haefke, 2006). Second, assuming firm-level labor unions representing
more than one worker, it is natural to assume bargaining with large firms. Considering
the production technology of the firm, final goods are produced by using labor as the
only input factor. Workers can either be employed directly at the respective firm (reg-
ular workers), or they are borrowed from temporary work agencies (assigned temporary
workers). The amount of regular workers employed at firm j is denoted by Lj,R, while
Lj,A gives the amount of temporary agency workers used in the production. The firm’s
production technology is described by
Yj = τ · [Lj,R + Lj,A]ρ with ρ ∈ (0, 1), (3.13)
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where τ denotes an efficiency parameter and ρ captures decreasing returns to scale in the
production. Using this type of production technology reflects the idea that regular workers
and temporary agency workers are perfect substitutes. This is a reasonable assumption
because temporary agency employment is used in almost all branches and in particular
in blue-collar, low-skilled jobs, to replace regular workers doing simple tasks. The reason
to replace regular workers doing simple tasks is all about lowering costs.
The instantaneous profit of a firm is given by3
pij = pj(Yj)Yj − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (3.14)
with pj(Yj) representing the firm’s inverse goods demand function that can be derived
from eq. (3.12). Variable wR denotes the wage rate of regular workers. The fee the firm
has to pay to the temporary work agency is depicted by x, while h denotes the costs of
posting a vacancy in state A and R. Parameter ε describes regulatory costs or rather in-
stitutional barriers associated with firm’s use of temporary employment, e.g. employment
protection, the maximum period of assignment, synchronization ban and re-employment
ban. Next to institutional regulations, there are often voluntary firm-level agreements
between employers and employee representations regulating the use of temporary agency
employment. For instance, such agreements limit the share of temporary agency workers
on all employees within a firm or specify a maximum duration of assignment undercutting
the legal time limit. Furthermore, they may include commitments for transferring tempo-
rary workers to regular contracts after a specific assignment period or expand the rights
of the employees representative committee with increasing temporary agency employment
used within the firm.4 Such non-institutional firm-level costs of temporary agency work
are convexly increasing in the number of employed temporary workers, as many of these
regulations apply only if the amount of temporary agency workers in the firm exceeds
specific levels. In principle, it holds that the stronger the employee representation in a
3Appendix 3.A.2 shows that this profit function is strictly concave and, hence, a profit maximum
exists.
4An overview of such voluntary firm-level agreements used in Germany are provided by R. Krause
(2012).
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firm, the more agreements apply with an increasing amount of temporary agency work-
ers. The convexity of the costs is reflected by parameter σ > 1.5 Vj,R and Vj,A denote the
number of vacancies firm j posts for regular and temporary workers, respectively.
3.3.4 Workers
The expected value of regular employment is given by
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR). (3.15)
Wage rate wR reflects the instantaneous inflow of being regularly employed, while the
second term depicts the loss from becoming unemployed weighted by its probability of
occurrence δ. The expected value of being unemployed is given by
rΨU = z + θTm(θT ) · (ΨT −ΨU) + θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨU). (3.16)
Parameter z denotes the net income of being unemployed. The last two terms at the right-
hand-side (RHS) describe the expected gain from possible changes in the labor market
state. Similarly, the present discounted value of being in the pool of the temporary work
agency is
rΨT = wT + δ · (ΨU −ΨT ) + θAm(θA) · (ΨA −ΨT ) + γT · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨT ). (3.17)
Variable wT denotes the payment that temporary agency workers receive for being in the
pool of the temporary work agency.6 By searching on-the-job they may improve their
position in the labor market and find regular employment with probability γT θRm(θR).
The worker’s expected value of assigned temporary agency employment is
rΨA = wA + χ · (ΨT −ΨA) + γA · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨA), (3.18)
5This type of convex costs is also used by Koskela & Scho¨b (2010) and Ranjan (2013). They argue that
the costs of offshoring are convex. Such costs are similar to the costs of temporary agency employment
as offshoring is also used as a potential cost-saving production alternative for firms.
6This labor market setup fits well to Central European countries such as France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden (Arrowsmith, 2006). In those countries temporary workers even receive a wage when
they are just on the books of the temporary work agency.
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with wA denoting the wage that temporary workers receive being assigned to a firm. For
simplicity reasons it is assumed that the agency sets wT and wA in a way that makes
the worker at the margin indifferent between being unemployed, being in the pool of
temporary employment agencies, or being assigned to a client firm, such that
ΨU = ΨT = ΨA. (3.19)
Even if this assumption seems quite strong at first sight, it is reasonable. It reflects the
fact that temporary agency workers usually have a rather weak bargaining position as they
are not organized in labor unions (see, e.g., Storrie, 2002; Dolado et al., 2000; Neugart &
Storrie, 2006). Furthermore, workers may accept a rather low utility out of being employed
at a temporary employment agency. They use temporary employment as a stepping stone
to regular employment. The probability of finding a regular job while being employed
at a temporary employment agency is higher compared to finding a regular job out of
being unemployed. Moreover, eq. (3.19) simplifies the model significantly. Applying this
assumption, the value functions (3.15) to (3.18) simplify to
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR) (3.20)
rΨT = wT + γT θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨT ) (3.21)
rΨA = wA + γA θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨA) (3.22)
rΨU = z + θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨU). (3.23)
3.3.5 Labor Unions
It is assumed that all regularly employed workers are members of a labor union. Firm
specific, symmetric labor unions determine the wage rate for regular workers by maximiz-
ing the rent of its members. The rent of a union member equals the difference between
the expected value of regular employment and the outside option, which is the value of
being unemployed. Thus, the rent of a union member is given by ΨR−ΨU . As the union
bargains for all regular workers that are employed at firm j, the utility of the respective
labor union is formally represented by
Uj = [ΨR −ΨU ] · Lj,R. (3.24)
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3.3.6 Temporary Employment Agencies
Temporary employment agencies pay a wage rate wA to temporary workers that are
assigned to a client firm and a wage rate wT to unassigned temporary workers that are
only in the pool of the agency. For each assigned temporary worker, the agency receives
a fee x from the firm the worker is lend to.
In contrast to firms, it is considered to have one-worker agencies. Each agency offers
a single vacancy that can be filled by an unemployed worker. In case of a successful
match, the unemployed worker switches to the worker pool of the agency and waits for
assignment at a client firm. The agency’s expected profit of posting a vacancy is
rΩV = −h˜+m(θT )[ΩT − ΩV ], (3.25)
where h˜ denotes the cost of a vacancy.7 The expected profit of having a worker on hold,
ΩT , is
rΩT = −wT + θAm(θA)[ΩA − ΩT ] + γT θRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩT ] + δ[ΩV − ΩT ]. (3.26)
Even in case of a filled vacancy, eq. (3.26), there is no positive flow income but, on the
contrary, the agency has to pay wT . Having a vacancy filled is only worthwhile for the
agency due to the potential assignment of the worker to a client firm. This is reflected
by the second term at the right-hand-side. In general, the last three terms denote the
expected gains/losses due to changes in the different labor market states. Finally, the
agency’s expected profit of assigning a worker to a client firm is given by
rΩA = x− wA + γAθRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩA] + χ[ΩT − ΩA], (3.27)
where x−wA denotes the flow profit in this state. Using eqs. (3.25) to (3.27), the agency’s
job creation can formally be described as
h˜
m(θT )
=
θAm(θA)(x− wA)− wT [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
[r + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR) + δ] · [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]− χθAm(θA) . (3.28)
7Agency’s vacancy costs h˜ differ from the firm’s vacancy costs h with h > h˜. This reflects the fact
that the firms’ screening process of potential employees is more intensive, since they are more interested
in long-term employment relationships and stronger rules of employment protection apply, while agencies
are able to quit the employment relationship easier.
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3.4 Solution of the Model
Recalling the assumption that the values of being unemployed, being in the pool of the
temporary agency employment agency, and being assigned to a client firm coincide, the
wage rates of assigned and unassigned temporary workers can be derived using the workers’
asset functions. The bargaining problems between firms and unions and firms and agencies
are interrelated due to the substitutability of regular and temporary employment in the
firms’ production technology. Hence, the whole bargaining game consists of two stages
involving three bargaining parties: Firms, unions, and temporary employment agencies.
1. In the first stage, there are two simultaneous bargaining games. On the one hand,
the firm bargains with the agency over the fee the firm has to pay to the agency to
use temporary agency workers in the production process. As we are dealing with
one-worker agencies, the bargaining problem is of the type individual bargaining.
On the other hand, the labor union determines the wage rate of regular workers.
As the union is responsible for all regular workers in a firm, the bargaining problem
is a collective one. For both bargaining games the model uses the so-called right-
to-manage model. The negotiation games are further specified in the respective
subsections.
2. In the second stage, the firm uses its ”right to manage” to set the respective em-
ployment levels for regular and temporary workers.
In order to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the whole bargaining game,
the two stages have to be solved by backward induction.
3.4.1 Wage Determination for Agency Workers
Workers are indifferent between being unemployed or in either state of temporary agency
employment. This is given by eq. (3.19). Thus, the wage rates that temporary agency
workers receive can easily be computed by combining the asset functions being temporarily
employed and being unemployed. Using eqs. (3.20), (3.21), and (3.23), the wage for
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unassigned temporary workers turns out to be
wT = z + (wR − z) · ΓT (θR) where ΓT (θR) =
[
(1− γT )θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (3.29)
Similarly, using eqs. (3.20), (3.22), and (3.23), the wage for assigned temporary workers
can be computed as
wA = z + (wR − z) · ΓA(θR) where ΓA(θR) =
[
(1− γA)θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (3.30)
Wages are set as a mark-up over net unemployment income. The mark-up is denoted
by Γl(θR) with l = A, T . As the wage rate for regular workers is larger than the net
income of being unemployed, it is easy to see that the mark-up is only positive if the
search effectiveness parameters γT and γA are smaller than unity. Parameters γT and γA
being equal to unity means that the search effectiveness of temporary workers coincides
with that of unemployed workers. In this case, the wage rates of both types of temporary
workers simplify to the net unemployment income, i.e. wT = wA = z. It seems plausible
to assume that the search effectiveness of unassigned and assigned temporary workers is
larger than the search effectiveness of an unemployed worker. In this case, the resulting
wage rates are smaller than the net income of being unemployed. At first sight, this sounds
counterintuitive. However, it reveals the idea that unassigned and assigned temporary
workers temporarily accept a lower wage because they hope to find a regular job with
larger probability compared to looking for regular employment while being unemployed.
This is in line with the idea that temporary agency work is a stepping stone into regular
employment.
3.4.2 Firm’s Labor Demand
The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is given by
max
Vj,R(s),Vj,A(s)
Lj,R(s),Lj,A(s)
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
{
p(Yj)Yj−wR(s)Lj,R(s)−εx(s)Lσj,A(s)−h [Vj,A(s)+Vj,R(s)]
}
ds,
(3.31)
subject to the laws of motion for assigned temporary and regular workers, eqs. (3.3)
and (3.4), and the goods demand and production function, given by eqs. (3.12) and
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(3.13), respectively. Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian that solves this intertemporal
maximization problem can formally be stated as
H = τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R)
+ λ1[m(θR)Vj,R − δLj,R] + λ2[m(θA)Vj,A − χLj,A − γAθRm(θR)Lj,A],
(3.32)
with eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) denoting the equations of motion for the state variables Lj,R and
Lj,A, and λ1 ≡ µ1e−r(s−t) and λ2 ≡ µ2e−r(s−t) being the current-value Lagrange multipli-
ers. Variables Vj,A and Vj,R are the control variables of the intertemporal maximization
problem. Parameter κ ≡ (η − 1)/η, with κ ∈ (0, 1), reflects the firm’s monopoly power
in the goods market. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power. The relevant
first-order conditions of the intertemporal maximization problem are
∂H
∂Vj,R
= −h+ λ1m(θR) = 0 (3.33)
∂H
∂Vj,A
= −h+ λ2m(θA) = 0 (3.34)
∂H
∂Lj,R
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR − δλ1 = rλ1 − λ˙1 (3.35)
∂H
∂Lj,A
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A − λ2[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] = rλ2 − λ˙2. (3.36)
In the steady state it has to hold that λ˙1 = λ˙2 = 0 and ˙Lj,R = ˙Lj,A = 0. By substituting
eqs. (3.33) and (3.34) in eqs. (3.35) and (3.36), respectively, the first-order conditions
turn out to be
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR = (r + δ) h
m(θR)
(3.37)
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A = [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (3.38)
Eqs. (3.37) and (3.38) determine the firm’s labor demand for regular and assigned tempo-
rary workers. Theoretically, it may be possible that firms only produce with one type of
labor. Appendix 3.A.3 discusses the conditions for such corner solutions to appear. How-
ever, in the following it is assumed that parameters are such that regular and temporary
employment are both positive, i.e. there is an interior solution.8
8This rather restrictive assumption is based on Ranjan (2013, p. 176) who uses a similar assumption
concerning the two production factors domestic labor and foreign produced input, which are perfect
substitutes in production.
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It can be easily shown that9
dLj,R
dwR
< 0,
dLj,R
dx
> 0,
dLj,A
dx
< 0 and
dLj,A
dwR
> 0.
3.4.3 Wage Determination for Regular Workers
The wage rate for regular workers is determined by collective bargaining. Since the union
represents all regular employed workers in a firm, it has a very strong bargaining position.
Thus, it is assumed that wages are determined by a special variant of the right-to-manage
model, namely the monopoly union model. This simplifies the formal analysis of the
model. Having monopoly power, the union has the exclusive right to set the wage rate of
regular workers. In response, the firm sets the corresponding employment level. Thus, the
union has to take account of the firm’s labor demand for regular workers that decreases in
the wage of regular workers as well as the labor demand for assigned temporary workers
that increases in the wage of regular workers.
The monopoly union maximizes its objective function, eq. (3.24), subject to the total
labor demand of the firm, given by eqs. (3.37) and (3.38). Using eqs. (3.20) and (3.23),
the rent of a single worker can be stated as
ΨR −ΨU = wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
. (3.39)
The union’s maximization problem can formally be stated by the following Lagrangian
function:
L =
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
· Lj,R + ξ1
[
r + δ
m(θR)
h− ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−1I1−κ + wR
]
+ ξ2
[
r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)
m(θA)
h− wR − r + δ
m(θR)
h+ σεxLσ−1j,A
]
.
(3.40)
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂Lj,R
=
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
− ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ = 0 (3.41)
∂L
∂Lj,A
= −ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ + ξ2 · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A = 0 (3.42)
∂L
∂wR
=
Lj,R
r + δ + θRm(θR)
+ ξ1 − ξ2 = 0. (3.43)
9Appendix 3.A.4 provides the detailed calculations.
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Combining eqs. (3.41) to (3.43), the wage rate for regular workers is given by
wR = z + Lj,R
[
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
]
. (3.44)
Evaluation of the RHS of eqs. (3.44) reveals that the term in corner brackets is positive.
Thus, the union sets the wage rate for regular workers as a mark-up over the net income
of being unemployed.
3.4.4 Determination of the Fee for Firm’s Use of Temporary
Employment
The fee for using a temporary worker in the production is determined by bargaining
between firms and temporary work agencies. As each agency employs only one worker,
the bargaining problem is similar to individual bargaining. In contrast to the monopoly
union model which is used for the determination of the union’s wage claims, firms and
agencies bargain directly over the fee. This reflects the fact that, compared to the labor
union, a single agency is less powerful in the negotiation. Furthermore, firms that hire
more than one agency worker have to bargain with several temporary employment agencies
separately.
The firm treats each additional assigned temporary worker as a marginal worker.
Thus, the rent of the firm in the Nash product equals the contribution of an additional
assigned temporary worker that is formally represented by the partial derivative of the
firms profit with respect to Lj,A. As it has to be taken into account that the labor demand
of regular and assigned temporary workers are mutually best responses, the firm’s profit
is evaluated at the optimal labor demand for regular workers, L∗j,R. Thus, the generalized
Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and the agency can be stated as
max
x
[
ΩA − ΩT
]β
·
[∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
]1−β
with β ∈ (0, 1), (3.45)
where β denotes the agency’s bargaining power. The agency’s rent, ΩA − ΩT , can be
computed using eqs. (3.25) to (3.27) and the free entry condition, ΩV = 0. It is formally
given by
ΩA − ΩT =
x− wA + wT + h˜m(θT ) · [γT θRm(θR) + δ − γAθRm(θR)]
r + χ+ θAm(θA) + γAθRm(θR)
. (3.46)
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Taking into account that the number of regular workers is chosen to maximize the firm’s
profit, the marginal contribution of an additional assigned temporary agency worker for
the firm is given by
∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
= wR − σεxLσ−1j,A . (3.47)
Thus, the first-order condition of the bargaining problem in eq. (3.45) is
β ·(wR−σεxLσ−1j,A ) = (1−β)·[x−wA+wT+ h˜m(θT ) ·[γT θRm(θR)+δ−γAθRm(θR)]
]
·σεLσ−1j,A .
(3.48)
After some rearrangement, the optimal fee for temporary workers can be obtained as
x = β
wR
σεLσ−1j,A
+ (1− β)
[(
wA +
h˜
m(θT )
γAθRm(θR)
)
−
(
wT +
h˜
m(θT )
[γT θRm(θR) + δ]
)]
.
(3.49)
In the case that the whole bargaining power is on the side of the agency (i.e. β = 1), the
fee would equal the first term on the RHS. Thus, the agency would set the fee in order
to equate the unit costs of regular and assigned temporary employment. In the case that
the whole bargaining power is on the firm’s side (i.e. β = 0), the fee would equal the term
in corner brackets. It would therefore hold, that the firm’s fee is exactly the difference
between the agency’s total costs of an assigned temporary job and the agency’s total
costs of an unassigned temporary worker. As the bargaining power is shared between the
firm and the agency, the optimal fee is the weighted sum of the aforementioned described
terms.
3.5 Steady-State Equilibrium
The key endogenous variables θi, wi, x, Li and U for i = T,A,R are determined by the flow
equations (3.5) to (3.7) and (3.9), the labor demand equations (3.28), (3.37) and (3.38),
the equations for workers wage rates (3.29), (3.30) and (3.44), and the fee that firms have
to pay for using temporary agency employment in the production, eq. (3.49). Furthermore,
in equilibrium the resource constraint, that aggregate demand and aggregate production
coincide, has to hold. Hence,
Y ≡
∫ n
0
Yj
(
Pj
P
)
dj (3.50)
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is fulfilled. Due to symmetry of the firms in equilibrium, the firm’s price coincides with
the aggregate price level, hence, pi = 1, and eq. (3.50) simplifies to Y = nYj.
3.6 Calibration
To describe the model equilibrium and to show the effects of the legal deregulation, the
model is calibrated using values that result in an overall unemployment rate that is similar
to what is observed for industrialized countries. The matching function that is used in
the following is of Cobb-Douglas type and formally represented by
M = ζ · V 1−αi · Sαi . (3.51)
Parameter α indexes the matching elasticity and ζ is a scale parameter denoting the
efficiency of the matching process. Following Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001), the matching
elasticity is set to α = 0.5. The scale parameter of the matching function is ζ = 0.3
(M. U. Krause & Uhlig, 2012).
As described in the outline of the model, unions are modeled to embody the full wage-
setting power in the determination of regular workers’ wages. In contrast to that, it is
assumed that in firm-agency bargaining over the firm’s fee for using temporary agency
employment, agencies have a rather low bargaining power, set to β = 0.2. This is mainly
based on two reasons. First, contrary to unions who embody specific human capital and
clearly differ from each other, firms may be rather indifferent between the agencies to
bargain with since the workers that are represented by temporary work agencies perform
more or less simple tasks. Second, the agencies’ relatively low bargaining power reflects
the existing imbalance in the size of firms using temporary agency employment and its
supplier. Even if limiting the size of the agency in the present model to one worker is
rather restrictive, empirical studies support this imbalance in the size of the bargaining
parties. For instance, while the workforce of almost all German firms using temporary
agency employment comprises more than 50 employees (Crimmann et al., 2009), 82%
of the temporary employment agencies have less than 20 employees (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit, 2016a).
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Reflecting the idea of temporary agency work being a stepping stone to regular em-
ployment, it is assumed that the search effectiveness of temporary agency workers is
larger compared to that of unemployed workers. Furthermore, the search effectiveness of
assigned temporary workers even exceeds that of unassigned temporary workers. Albeit
not under their contract, assigned temporary workers already work for regular firms and
therefore have a higher chance to find regular employment compared to unassigned tem-
porary workers. This idea is captured by the parameterization of γA = 1.2 and γT = 1.15.
For simplicity reasons it is assumed that any type of job is destroyed with exogenous
rate δ = χ = 0.02 (M. U. Krause & Uhlig, 2012).10 The net income of being unemployed
is assumed to be related to the wage rate of regular workers with a standard value of
the replacement ratio of 60%. The interest rate is r = 0.05, goods demand elasticity is
chosen equal to η = 2.5, resulting in κ = 0.6, and the production function parameter
is ρ = 0.9. Parameter σ, assuring convexity of the cost function of assigned temporary
agency employment and reflecting firm-level costs of voluntary restrictions of temporary
employment, is chosen to be σ = 1.2. This ensures that the cost function is not too con-
vex.11 The size of the labor force, N , and the scale parameter of the production function,
τ , are normalized to unity. For simplicity reasons it is assumed that the costs of posting
a job at a regular firm and a temporary employment agency coincide and are equal to
h = h˜ = 0.058. Parameter ε can be considered as regulatory costs of temporary agency
employment compared to regulatory costs of regular employment, which are normalized
to unity. For the calibration in this Section, regulatory costs of temporary agency em-
ployment are assumed to be slightly higher than for regular workers, ε = 1.1. This reflects
still existing legal regulations, such as the maximum period of assignment or the equal
10According to Haller & Jahn (2014), labor turnover in temporary agency jobs is five times higher than
in regular employment. In the present model, this labor turnover is described by the combination of a
higher rate of exogenous job destruction and successful on-the-job search of agency workers. However,
as a higher value for the rate of job destruction does not qualitatively change the results of Sections 3.6
and 3.7, it is for simplicity reasons assumed that δ and χ coincide.
11If the costs are too convex, there is no interior solution and the firms only use regular employment in
the production. This is theoretically possible, but not realistic as the average rate of temporary agency
employment in industrialized countries is about 2%.
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Table 3.1: Calibration parameter values for Germany
Parameter Description Value
α Matching elasticity 0.5
β Bargaining power of the agency 0.2
γA Search effectiveness of assigned temporary workers 1.2
γT Search effectiveness of unassigned temporary workers 1.15
δ, χ Job destruction rate 0.02
ε Regulatory costs of temporary workers 0.5-1.4
ζ Matching efficiency 0.3
η Goods demand elasticity 2.5
ρ Production function parameter 0.9
σ Non-institutional, firm-level costs of using temporary workers 1.2
τ Efficiency of the production technology 1
h, h˜ Costs of posting a vacancy 0.058
N Size of the labor force 1
r Interest rate 0.05
z Net income of being unemployed 0.6 · wR
pay obligation for regular and temporary workers. In Section 3.7, ε varies, taking values
in the domain 0.5 to 1.4. The reason for ε varying in a rather wide range is as follows:
regulatory costs of temporary agency employment may be smaller than for regular em-
ployment (ε < 1), because there is either no or rather a weak employment protection.
On the other hand, they may be higher (ε > 1), e.g. due to the synchronization ban
and re-employment ban. Table 3.1 provides the full list of parameter values used in the
calibration.
The parameter values chosen fit well with the employment structure observable in
Germany. Temporary employment in almost all OECD countries is around 2% (CIETT,
2013). The currently observed overall unemployment rate in Germany is about 6.5%
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2016b). The model predicts an unemployment rate of 6.7%,
almost coinciding with the current value observed for Germany. Temporary employment
(assigned and unassigned temporary work) equals 2.7%, while the rate of regular employ-
ment is 90.6%.
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3.7 Decrease in Regulatory Costs For Using Tempo-
rary Agency Workers
As indicated in Section 3.1, in recent decades there have been continuous deregulation
efforts regarding temporary agency work aiming at more flexible European labor markets.
This section takes a closer look at the effects of such a deregulation, which is modeled
as a reduction in regulatory costs ε. Calibrating the model using the values stated in
Section 3.6 and a varying degree of ε ∈ (0.4, 1.5), the effects of a legal deregulation on the
workers’ wage rates and the firm’s fee for using temporary agency employment, depicted
in Figure 3.2, can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Workers’ wage rates decrease with increasing deregulation, while the
firm’s fee for using temporary agency employment increases in the degree of deregulation.
Furthermore, Figure 3.3 depicts the steady-state employment rates for the different
values of ε and can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3.2. The legal deregulation of temporary agency employment leads to a
monotonic reduction in unemployment as it lowers firm’s production costs and, thus,
induces a higher overall labor demand. At the same time, it increases regular employment
and, hence, the degree of employment covered by labor union bargaining. Unassigned
temporary employment also increases monotonically. However, there is a hump-shaped
relationship between regulatory costs and temporary agency employment used in the firm’s
production.
The firm’s decision of using regular or temporary agency employment in the production
is based on the marginal costs of the respective worker. Due to the substitutability of
both types of workers, marginal costs of regular and temporary workers have to coincide in
equilibrium and, furthermore, have to be balanced with marginal revenue. The optimality
conditions of the firm’s intertemporal optimization problem, eq. (3.37) for regular workers
and eq. (3.38) for temporary agency workers, can be rearranged such that the left-hand-
sides (LHS) equal the firm’s marginal revenue. The RHS denotes the marginal costs of
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the respective type of worker:
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
(3.52)
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = σεxLσ−1j,A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (3.53)
The marginal costs of both groups of workers consist of two parts each. The first term of
the respective marginal cost function reflects the unit costs of an additional worker, while
the second term represents the costs of posting a vacancy that are taken into account in
the intertemporal maximization problem.
Recall that the wage rate for regular workers, the fee, and the employment rates are
determined in two stages. In the first stage, labor unions set the wage rate wR and, at the
same time, agencies and firms bargain over the fee x. In the second stage, firms respond
by choosing the optimal employment levels of the respective type of worker based on
the determined wage rate and the fee. While unions take the employment responses for
regular and temporary agency employment into account, the one-worker agency neglects
the effects of its own behavior on the employment level of assigned temporary workers.
A reduction in regulatory costs leads ceteris paribus to a decrease in the unit costs of
temporary agency workers which, in principle, increases the firm’s demand for this type of
workers. The resulting increase in assigned temporary agency employment LA decreases
the firm’s marginal revenue. Due to the substitutability of regular and temporary work-
ers, unions have to reduce their wage claims as a reaction to the legal deregulation to
prevent a substitution of regular employment by temporary workers. This can also be
seen from eq. (3.44). The resulting reduction in labor union’s wage claims maintains the
attractiveness of using regular employment compared to temporary agency employment.
Furthermore, the decrease in unit costs increases the firm’s labor demand for regular
workers. The increase in regular employment cushions the firm’s increasing demand for
temporary agency employment initialized by the shock in ε. To state it differently, legal
deregulation leads to an overall increase in firms’ labor demand, which is not fully served
by temporary agency employment but (partly) substituted by an increase in regular em-
ployment. Figure 3.2a shows that wR decreases monotonically, but with decreasing rate.
Furthermore, Figure 3.3a shows that LR increases monotonically, but with decreasing rate.
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(a) wage rate of regular workers (b) fee for using temp. workers
(c) wage rate of assigned temp. workers (d) wage rate of unassigned temp. workers
Figure 3.2: Reaction of Fee and Wages to Changing Regulatory Costs of Temporary
Agency Employment
The concavity of regular employment stems from the convex costs of temporary agency
employment. The higher the rate of assigned temporary employment, the larger its im-
pact on the marginal costs of temporary workers. As the union considers the employment
effects for both types of labor input in the wage determination, it anticipates that the
less regulated and, ceteris paribus, the higher assigned temporary agency employment,
the higher its impact on the marginal costs of assigned temporary workers. Thus, the
substitution of regular employment by temporary agency workers declines in LA as its
impact on the marginal costs of temporary agency employment increases. The resulting
changes in the wage claims and the employment rate of regular workers are, therefore,
weaker.
As stated above, the reduction in regulatory costs directly affects the marginal costs of
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(a) regular employment (b) assigned temp. employment
(c) unemployment (d) unassigned temp. employment
Figure 3.3: Employment Reaction to Changing Regulatory Costs of Temporary Agency
Employment
temporary workers, LHS of eq. (3.53), and ceteris paribus increases the labor demand for
this production factor. Although, as can be seen directly from eq. (3.49), the decrease in
regulatory costs encourages the agencies to increase the fee x and, by this, the agencies’
profit. This increase cushions the reduction in marginal costs as it opposes the effect
initialized by the shock in regulatory costs. As agencies and firms bargain individually
and agencies are small (one worker), the agency does not take into account that the firm
responses by adjusting the amount of temporary agency work due to changes in the fee x.
Even if the employment response of temporary employment may still be positive overall,
the increase in the fee x dampens the firm’s increasing labor demand for this employment
type induced by legal deregulation.
Furthermore, as the agency considers the firm’s demand for regular employment in
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the determination of the fee x, it anticipates that the lower the legal regulation, the
lower the firm’s adjustment of regular employment to changes in regulatory costs. The
agency assumes that with decreasing ε its scope to adjust x upwards increases. Thus,
the fee x increases convexly in decreasing legal regulation of temporary agency work.
This is depicted in Figure 3.2b. However, the agency does not take into account that
the less regulated temporary agency work and, ceteris paribus, the higher the demand
for temporary agency workers, the higher its impact on the convex unit costs of this
production factor, see RHS of eq. (3.53). These two reasons, the increase in x and LA’s
increasing impact on marginal costs, finally lead to the marginal costs of temporary agency
employment being higher than the firm’s marginal revenue and, furthermore, the marginal
costs of regular employment. Thus, firms react to the agencies behavior with a reduction
in temporary agency employment in order to balance marginal revenue and marginal costs,
eq. (3.53). Overall, the aforementioned mechanisms lead to the hump-shaped relationship
of temporary agency employment and regulatory costs, as shown in Figure 3.3b.12
Using the argumentation above, the steady-state changes of the wage rates of tem-
porary agency workers can be explained. The wage rates of temporary workers, given in
eqs. (3.29) and (3.30), positively depend on the wage rate of regular workers. The higher
the wage rate of regular workers, the higher the mark-up on unemployment income and,
thus, the higher the wage rate of temporary agency workers. Hence, the behavior of
the wages qualitatively coincide with that of regular workers’ wages. This is depicted in
Figures 3.2c and 3.2d.
Furthermore, Figure 3.3c gives the steady-state unemployment rate for varying values
of ε. Even if the composition of the firm’s increased labor demand is a priori unclear, it
is obvious that legal deregulation leads to an overall increase in total employment as it
decreases the costs of both inputs, regular and temporary workers. Thus, based on the
depicted development of the employment rates of regular and assigned temporary workers,
12Next to the effects on unit costs, the agency’s and union’s behavior also affects the second part of
the marginal costs, the vacancy costs that are taken into account in the intertemporal maximization
problem. For simplicity reasons, these effects are not considered in more detail in the argumentation
provided above.
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(a) firm’s profit (b) utility of the labor union
Figure 3.4: Evolution of Firm’s Profits and Union’s Utility due to Changing Regulatory
Costs of Temporary Agency Employment
legal deregulation of temporary agency employment leads to a monotonic decrease in
overall unemployment.
Figure 3.3d shows that unassigned temporary agency employment monotonically in-
creases in legal deregulation. Having in mind that there is a hump-shaped relationship
of assigned temporary employment and regulatory costs, this may be counterintuitive at
first sight. The reason is that legal deregulation leads to an increase in the fee x, which
increases the expected profit of the agency, eq. (3.27). More agencies enter the market
leading to an increase in employment of unassigned temporary workers. Thus, legal dereg-
ulation of temporary agency employment drives agencies to hoard idle labor waiting for
an assignment in a client firm.
Finally, we take a closer look at the firm’s profit and the union’s utility due to chang-
ing regulatory costs. This is depicted in Figure 3.4. Legal deregulation of temporary
agency employment leads to a more profitable production alternative for firms and damp-
ens union’s wage claims. Furthermore, it decreases the costs of using temporary agency
employment in the production. Thus, it is intuitive that the firm’s profit monotonically
increases in the degree of legal deregulation, as depicted in Figure 3.4a. Even if regular
employment increases monotonically in legal deregulation, the wage rate for regular work-
ers and, hence, the rent of a single worker, decreases. The increase in regular employment
does not balance the loss in individual workers’ rent. Thus, the utility of the labor union
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decreases in legal deregulation, see Figure 3.4b. Even if the rate of regular employment
and, as a consequence, the degree of union coverage in the economy increases, unions
suffer by declining wages caused by temporary agency employment.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter develops a theoretical model to analyze the general equilibrium effects of
the legal deregulation of temporary agency employment on negotiated wages and the
employment structure in a unionized economy. Large firms produce differentiated goods
using labor as the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly by the
firm (regular workers) or by temporary employment agencies that lend the workers to the
firms for the production process. Both types of work are perfect substitutes. Regular
workers are represented by firm-level labor unions, which are assumed to be monopoly
unions. Temporary employment agencies are small (one worker) and bargain individually
with the firm over the fee that the agency receives from the firm for borrowing a worker.
In response to the determined fee and the claimed wage, the firm chooses the respective
employment levels used in its production.
While there already exist contributions on labor unions and temporary employment
agencies in the literature, the present model is the first that combines temporary agency
employment and the wage-setting behavior of labor unions in a frictional labor market to
discuss the agency’s impact on regular employment and the overall employment structure
in the economy.
The most striking result is that the model predicts that legal deregulation of temporary
agency employment does not lead to a steady increase in this employment type implying
that there is no substitution of regular employment. Instead, there exists a hump-shaped
relationship between temporary agency employment and its degree of legal deregulation.
Whereas deregulation out of a high degree of regulation leads to an increase in temporary
agency employment, its rate decreases the more extensive legal deregulation is. Thus,
deregulation efforts of the temporary agency employment sector that occurred in most
European countries in recent decades, do not inevitable lead to a strengthening of this
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sector, but may even lead to a declining rate of temporary agency employment in the
economy. At the same time, the rate of regular employment increases monotonically and
overall employment benefits from the deregulation.
The reason for the hump-shaped pattern of temporary agency employment and the
steady increase in regular employment is the cost structure of temporary agency employ-
ment. There are often voluntary, non-institutional firm-level agreements restricting the
degree of temporary agency employment used in the production. Thus, the costs of tem-
porary agency employment increase convexly. The higher the rate of temporary agency
employment induced by legal deregulation, the higher the impact of the non-institutional
firm-level agreements on marginal costs. Because agencies are rather small compared to
the large firms they bargain with, they do not consider the consequences of the convex
cost structure in their negotiations. Combined with the fact that more attractive tempo-
rary agency employment forces the labor unions to reduce their wage claims for regular
employed workers to prevent employment losses and maintain the competitiveness with
temporary agency employment, temporary agency employment may even decrease in the
degree of legal deregulation, while regular employment increases monotonically.
Nevertheless, even if legal deregulation does not lead to a decline in the coverage of
collectively bargained wages in the economy, it leads to a reduction in workers’ wage rates
and a reduction in labor union’s utility.
These findings reject the main argument of opponents of temporary agency employ-
ment that its legal deregulation leads to a substitution of regular employment and to a
higher share of precarious employment. Hence, the policy makers’ idea, that legal dereg-
ulation of temporary agency employment increases the flexibility of the European labor
markets and brings people to work who may not find regular employment, seems to be ver-
ified. Thus, legal deregulation of temporary agency employment aiming at an increasing
employment level may be continued.
CHAPTER 3. LABOR UNIONS AND AGENCY WORK DEREGULATION 78
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Steady State Employment Flows
Using the steady-state conditions for each labor market state, the respective job-searchers
and the condition that U +LT +LA+LR = 1, the steady-state flows from the perspective
of the firm can be rewritten to obtain the respective flow equations for the different
employment rates
LT =
θTm(θT ) · (1− LR) + [χ− θTm(θT )] · LA
δ + θTm(θT ) + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)
(3.54)
LA =
θAm(θA)LT
χ+ γAθRm(θR)
(3.55)
LR =
[1− LT (1− γT )− LA(1− γA)] · θRm(θR)
δ + θRm(θR)
. (3.56)
The numerators denote the flows into and out of the respective labor market states.
Division by the respective denominator weights the flows by the average retention period
of a job in the respective state.
3.A.2 Concavity of the Firm’s Instantaneous Profit
Function
Using eqs. (3.12) and (3.13), the instantaneous profit of the firm, eq. (3.14), can be written
as
pij = τ
κ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wj,R Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (3.57)
with κ = (η − 1)/η. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power in the goods
market. The second order conditions are
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0 (3.58)
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A < 0 (3.59)
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0. (3.60)
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While the necessary condition for a profit maximum is that the first-order conditions are
equal to zero, the sufficient condition for a profit maximum is
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
−
(
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
)2
> 0. (3.61)
This can be seen to hold for κ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1:
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · [−σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A ] > 0. (3.62)
3.A.3 Corner Solutions in Firm’s Production
The decision of the firm, which type of labor input to use in the production, directly
depends on the marginal costs of each labor input. If the costs of an additional temporary
worker undercut (exceed) the marginal costs of a regular worker, the firm will only produce
with temporary workers (regular workers). Evaluating eqs. (3.37) and (3.38) at LA > 0
and LR = 0, it turns out that the firm will produce by solely using temporary workers in
the entire production, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = σxεLσ−1A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
< wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
.
On the contrary, evaluating eqs. (3.37) and (3.38) at LR > 0 and LA = 0, it follows that
the final good will be produced by solely using regular employment, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
< [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
.
Choosing the cost function of temporary employment to be convex (but not too convex)
ensures to rule out the first case, since temporary employment becomes too expensive
at a certain level of production. On the other hand, a convex cost function implies that
temporary workers are relatively cheap at a low level of production, making the second
case less likely. Thus, the probability to obtain an interior solution crucially depends on
the convexity of the cost function of temporary employment.
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3.A.4 Derivatives of Firm’s Labor Demand
Using eqs. (3.37) and (3.38), respectively, it turns out that the labor demand decreases
with respect to its own costs, i.e. formally
dLj,R
dwR
=
1
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0 (3.63)
and
dLj,A
dx
=
σLσ−1j,A
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A
< 0. (3.64)
Taking eqs. (3.63) and (3.64) into account, it can be shown that the labor demand of
regular (temporary) workers increases in the fee x (wage of regular workers)
dLj,R
dx
= −dLj,A
dx
> 0 (3.65)
dLj,A
dwR
=
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · dLj,RdwR
σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A − ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ
> 0. (3.66)
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Chapter 4
Temporary Work Agencies and
Technology: How Deregulation of
Temporary Agency Work Influences
the Technological Orientation of the
Economy
4.1 Introduction
Forty million people around the world are employed in so-called temporary agency employ-
ment (CIETT, 2015), a tripartite employment relationship in which workers are employed
at temporary work agencies that lend them to client firms that use the workers in the
production process without having a direct employment relationship with the respective
employee. This huge number almost equals the total size of employment in Germany,
Europe’s largest economy, with about 43.5 million workers (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit,
2017b). At the same time, temporary agency employment was – and in some coun-
tries still is – highly regulated and in public discussion temporary agency employment is
accused of being precarious employment that offers low income but no sustainable per-
spective for workers employed at the agencies. Indeed, there is a substantial wage gap up
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to 25% between regularly and temporarily employed workers (see, e.g., Jahn & Pozzoli,
2013) and labor turnover in agency employment is almost five times higher than that of
regular employment (Haller & Jahn, 2014). Nevertheless, workers and firms both have
incentives to engage in temporary agency employment. According to CIETT/Ecorys-NEI
(2002), temporary agency workers report their main reasons for engaging in temporary
agency employment to be using temporary agency employment as a stepping stone to
regular employment, to gain work experience and employability, and to earn money while
maintaining freedom and independence. For employers, there exist various reasons for
using temporary agency employment (see, e.g., Holst et al., 2010). Next to the motive of
saving costs and increase profits (Jahn & Weber, 2016b), temporary workers may be used
to adjust the workforce in production peaks, worker absence, or workforce fluctuation (see
Houseman, 2001; Ono & Sullivan, 2013). As temporary agency workers are not covered
by employment protection legislation, their use can be adjusted very flexible.
Legal regulation of temporary agency employment differs substantially across differ-
ent countries. Some countries have almost no restrictions in the use of temporary agency
employment, such as Austria, Denmark, the UK, and Sweden. Other countries limit the
use of temporary agency employment by restricting the length of the assignment of a
worker (e.g. Germany), or by allowing temporary agency employment only for specific
reasons. Furthermore, temporary agency employment may be limited to specific sectors.
Clauwaert (2000) and Arrowsmith (2006) give detailed overviews of the legal framework
of temporary agency work in the European Union. In more recent years, there have
been substantial legal deregulations in most European countries.1 In Germany, the dereg-
ulation was part of the labor market reform “Agenda 2010.” The main deregulations
were the elimination of the maximum period of assignment and the synchronization and
re-employment ban (see, e.g., Vitols, 2004; Antoni & Jahn, 2009).
In recent years, public discussion about temporary agency employment also found its
way into economic research. While Autor (2001, 2003) gives a first contribution to the
theoretical investigation, Neugart & Storrie (2006) discuss how an improved matching
efficiency in temporary agency jobs led to the substantial increase in temporary agency
1See Eurofound (2009), p. 12, Table 5, for the main regulatory changes since 2004.
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employment in the recent decades. The models of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 continue the
discussion of the role of temporary agency employment but especially focus on its effect
on the role and behavior of labor unions. While the former discusses firms’ strategic use
of temporary agency employment in the wage negotiations in order to dampen the wage
claims of labor unions, the latter analyzes the general equilibrium effects of temporary
agency employment on overall employment and the employment structure in a unionized
economy. This chapter sets a different focus. It analyzes how deregulation of the pro-
duction alternative of temporary agency employment affects the firms choice of different
technology levels and, hence, the technological orientation and organization of the whole
economy. Furthermore, it investigates how technological progress of the more intensively
used technology affects the economy and demonstrates which kind of economic policy is
suitable to dampen or even balance the effects caused by legal deregulation of the agency
work sector. The referred research questions are analyzed in a matching model according
to Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). In particular, the model is based
on the framework of Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who investigate the technology choice of
firms under worker heterogeneity, and Dolado et al. (2009), who extend the framework of
Albrecht & Vroman to on-the-job search.
One of the model’s core findings is that firms react to the legal deregulation of tem-
porary agency work by choosing to produce with technologies that use this type of em-
ployment more intensively. This form of employment is mainly used for simple tasks that
are produced with a less advanced technology. Thus, firms shift to production with the
basic, less advanced technology. As firms usually invest in technologies that they use
intensively and that increase their profits, deregulation of temporary agency work may
increase the firms incentive to invest in research and development in the technology that
is used in temporary agency production. Therefore, the paper also analyzes the macroe-
conomic effects of technological progress of temporary agency production and shows that
investments in this technology strengthen the effects induced by the legal deregulation.
Furthermore, it also shows that specific investments in the technological progress of more
advanced technologies may balance or at least dampen the effects of the deregulation.
Thus, it may be a beneficial economic policy to give incentives for investments in these
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technologies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief
overview of related literature. Section 4.3 gives a detailed description of the model frame-
work and Section 4.4 discusses the induced changes by legal deregulation and technological
progress on the technology choice of firms, the employment structure, and workers’ wages.
Section 4.5 summarizes the results and concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter combines and extends two fields of research: temporary agency employ-
ment and endogenous technology choice of firms. Recently, there has been substantial
research interest in temporary agency employment. However, most of the research con-
centrates on the empirical investigation of the following key issues: the strategic use of
temporary agency work in the production (e.g. Vidal & Tigges, 2009; Holst et al., 2010),
its effect on the employment structure (Haller & Jahn, 2014; Jahn & Weber, 2016a),
the wage differential of temporary agency work (Garz, 2013), and the idea of temporary
agency employment being a stepping stone to regular employment (Amuedo-Dorantes et
al., 2008; Autor & Houseman, 2010; Jahn & Rosholm, 2014). However, the more im-
portant for the present paper are the few theoretical contributions on temporary agency
work. Autor (2001, 2003) investigates the role of employment agencies in the screening
for regular employment and, in the latter contribution, describes that firms hesitate to
substitute the whole workforce by temporary agency workers because there are distinct
capital investments related to specific workers that would be lost with the use of the more
volatile temporary agency employment. The most important theoretical contribution is
provided by Neugart & Storrie (2006). Their model is the first that combines temporary
agency work and the matching model. The authors explain the increase in temporary
employment in recent years to be caused by an increased matching efficiency that was in-
duced by temporary employment agencies, which act as an intermediary in the matching
between firms and workers. Baumann et al. (2011) extend this framework by enriching
the model setup by endogenous job destruction. Beissinger & Baudy (2015) give another
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contribution by analyzing the firm’s strategic use of potential temporary agency work in
the wage-setting process to dampen the labor union’s wage claims. However, the model
neglects the general equilibrium effects. This is captured by Chapter 3 of this thesis. The
authors combine labor unions and temporary work agencies in the matching framework
and develop a model with large firms and in which both types of employment are per-
fect substitutes. However, they assume homogeneous firms and do not take into account
that cheaper or rather more attractive temporary agency employment may change the
technological orientation of the economy.
The second field of literature that is related to the present chapter is research on the
endogenous technology choice of firms. Acemoglu (1999) shows that for a heterogeneous
workforce, firms provide skill-specific jobs if the productivity difference between the two
skill levels is big enough or if the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy is
high enough. Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) use a model with endogenous technology
choice and heterogeneity on both sides of the market to study the effects of a skill-biased
technological change in the different systems of unemployment insurance and firing taxes
in Europe and the US.2 Another influential contribution, which the present model refers
to, is Albrecht & Vroman (2002). The authors model an economy with heterogeneity
on both sides of the labor market and analyze how a change in the skill composition
of the workers in the economy changes the endogenously determined technology choice
of firms. This framework serves as a base for extensive follow-up work. Davidson et al.
(2008) extend this framework to an open economy investigating the effects of international
offshoring on the technological orientation of the economy. Dolado et al. (2009) also use
the framework of Albrecht & Vroman and extend it by on-the-job search. Furthermore,
Liu et al. (2017) and Cords (2017) analyze the effects of immigration on the host country
enriching the basic model of Albrecht & Vroman appropriately.
2Another contribution is given by McKenna (1996). However, he does not endogenize the technology
choice of firms but the education decision of workers in a two-sector matching model and examines how
workers adjust their education decision to the availability of skill-demanding jobs.
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4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Basic Assumptions
The model is in continuous time. There is a unit mass of homogeneous workers who live
infinitely, are risk neutral, and discount the future at a common rate r > 0. Workers are
in one of three labor market states: they are either unemployed and looking for a job,
working at a firm in a regular job, or they are employed at a temporary work agency and
lend out to a client firm which uses them in the production process.3 Unemployed workers
look for employment and accept the first job offer they get, independent of whether it
is a temporary or regular job offer. Being regularly employed, the job gets destroyed at
an exogenous destruction rate δR. Temporary employed workers lose their jobs at rate
δT . Empirical research shows that temporary employment is more volatile, the turnover
rate is higher than for regular employment, and the average duration of employment in
temporary agency jobs is shorter than in regular employment (see e.g. Haller & Jahn,
2014). Therefore, it is assumed that δT > δR. While being employed in a temporary job,
workers search on-the-job for regular employment. Regularly employed workers do not
search on-the-job for other employment possibilities. On-the-job search for temporary
employed workers is a decisive characteristic of temporary agency employment, which
is modeled in the same way by Neugart & Storrie (2006) and Baumann et al. (2011).
The idea behind it is that workers use temporary agency employment as a stepping
stone to regular employment. Workers accept temporary employment offers, that are
usually related to lower wages compared to regular jobs, to signal potential employers
that they are willing to work and have specific abilities. By this, they hope to have an
3Other models, like Neugart & Storrie (2006) or Baudy & Cords (2016), include a fourth labor market
state in which temporary workers are under contract at a temporary work agency but have not been
assigned to a firm yet. Such a labor market state represents the institutional regulation that is called
synchronization ban. It means that the contract of the worker at the agency has to exceed the assignment
duration at the client firm. This synchronization ban still applies in some European countries, others
got rid of it with the institutional deregulation of temporary agency employment. The model framework
used in the present chapter fits to countries like UK or the US, but also to Germany who eliminated the
synchronization ban recently.
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advantage in finding a regular job compared to unemployed workers. This is also the
political idea behind temporary agency employment. Furthermore, on-the-job search of
temporary agency workers is the key difference to other forms of production alternatives,
like outsourcing or offshoring.
Unemployed workers and vacant jobs meet each other randomly. This is formally
described by the matching function
M = M(v, s). (4.1)
The instantaneous flow of hires M is determined by the vacancy rate v and the rate of
job seekers, s. As there are regular and temporary jobs in the economy, it holds that
v ≡ vR + vT , where vR denotes regular job vacancies and vT denotes temporary job
vacancies. Job-seekers are either part of the unemployment pool, u, or they are employed
in temporary jobs, (1 − u)ε, with ε being the fraction of temporary agency employment
on overall employment (1− u). The intensity of on-the-job search may deviate from the
search intensity in case of unemployment. As workers use temporary agency jobs as a
stepping stone to regular employment, it is assumed that their search intensity is higher
than that of unemployed workers. They signal potential employers their abilities and
willingness to work, which increases their search intensity and, thus, their arrival rate of
regular job offers. This is covered by search intensity parameter λ with λ ≥ 1.4 Thus, the
effective amount of (overall) job seekers is s ≡ u+ (1− u)ελ.
The matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both of its
arguments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Vacancies
meet job seekers at rate M(v, s)/v ≡ m(θ), whereby θ ≡ v/s denotes overall labor market
tightness. The tighter the labor market, i.e. the more vacancies per job seeker, the smaller
the arrival rate of job seekers per vacancy and, thus, m′(θ) < 0. Similarly, the worker’s
instantaneous arrival rate of a new job offer is M(v, s)/s = θm(θ). The tighter the labor
market, the higher the individual worker’s chance of finding a job, i.e. the higher the
4Dolado et al. (2009) also model on-the-job search and introduce search-intensity parameter λ. How-
ever, they investigate on-the-job-search in regular jobs. Therefore, they assume the search intensity
parameter to be positive but smaller 1. In the present case, λ < 1 is ruled out as it conflicts with the
stepping stone idea of temporary agency work.
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arrival rate of a new job offer and, thus, ∂θm(θ)/∂θ > 0. The construction of the labor
market tightness θ is one of the core differences between the model framework of Albrecht
& Vroman (2002) and Neugart & Storrie (2006). While Albrecht & Vroman define overall
labor market tightness θ and, e.g., distinguish the workers’ effective arrival rates for
the different types of jobs (i.e. different skill requirements) by multiplying the overall
labor market tightness with the share of regular or temporary job vacancies, Neugart &
Storrie define the labor market tightness for each submarket (i.e. temporary and regular
employment) separately. Thus, they calculate specific values of θ for regular employment
and another for assigned temporary workers, separately. The present model uses the
approach of Albrecht & Vroman.5
There is also a unit mass of firms in the economy. Firms are small and offer one job.
They decide ex-ante, before entering the market, whether to post a regular or tempo-
rary job vacancy. The difference between both types of vacancies is that the underlying
technology differs. The technology used in regular jobs is more advanced. Hence, the
production output per regular worker, yR, is higher than the output produced per tempo-
rary worker, yT . This is in line with the fact that - even if is used in almost all sectors -
temporary agency employment is most intensively used in simple tasks (for Germany, see
e.g. Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2017a). The reason for assuming that the more productive
technology requires regular employment is that production with more productive tech-
nologies often means more intensive training - even if the underlying skill requirements
may be the same in both types of production technologies. Using temporary agency
workers and the related higher labor turnover rate would lead to higher training costs
and, thus, to decreasing profits. Hence, it is assumed that in order to avoid such training
costs that are not explicitly modeled here the more advanced technology requires regular
employment.
The fraction of temporary job vacancies on all vacancies is described by γ = vT/(vR +
vT ), with γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the effective instantaneous arrival rate of a job offer for tempo-
rary employment is θm(θ)γ, while its counterpart for regular employment is θm(θ)(1−γ).
As there are two types of jobs and technologies, some workers will be regularly employed,
5Chapter 3, however, follows the approach of Neugart & Storrie (2006).
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while others end up in temporary agency employment. Temporary agency employment
can formally be stated as lT = (1 − u)ε, while lR = (1 − u)(1 − ε) represents regular
employment.
4.3.2 Workers and Firms
Workers are either directly employed at a firm (regular employment), unemployed, or
employed at a temporary work agency and lend to a firm for production. The worker’s
expected value of regular employment is
rV ER = w + δR[V
U − V ER + f ]. (4.2)
The worker receives wage income w. Furthermore, following Neugart & Storrie (2006),
in case of job destruction the worker receives severance payments f as a direct transfer
from the firm. Regular jobs are destroyed at exogenous rate δR. With job destruction the
worker loses V ER and falls back to the value of being unemployed, V
U . Hence, the loss of
a change in the labor market state is given by V U −V ER + f . The expected value of being
unemployed is
rVU = z + θm(θ)(1− γ)[V ER − V U ] + θm(θ)γ[V ET − V U ]. (4.3)
Unemployed workers receive net unemployment income z. The total amount of job seekers
is the sum of unemployed workers and temporary agency workers, s = u+ (1− u)ελ. As
v = vR+vT , the arrival rate θm(θ) is the contact rate of any individual in the worker pool
and any vacancy. To obtain the arrival rate on regular vacancies, this contact rate has
to be multiplied by the share of suitable vacancies (1− γ) leading to the effective regular
job offer arrival rate θm(θ)(1 − γ). For temporary job vacancies, the overall arrival rate
has to be multiplied by γ leading to the effective temporary job offer arrival rate θm(θ)γ.
The gain of a change in the labor market state to regular employment is V ER −V U and the
gain of a change in the labor market state to temporary employment is V ET − V U . Once
a worker is employed in a temporary employment agency, the expected value of this type
of employment is
rV ET = κw + δT [V
U − V ET ] + λθm(θ)(1− γ)[V ER − V ET ]. (4.4)
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Agency workers receive a wage income of κw, i.e. they receive κ times the wage rate
of regular workers, with κ < 1. Modeling the wage payment of temporary employment
as a fraction of the regular worker’s wage is based on Neugart & Storrie (2006). Next
to the potential loss of a change from temporary employment to unemployment, V U −
V ET , which occurs at rate δT , temporary agency workers search on-the-job for regular
employment. Contrary to regularly employed workers, temporary agency workers do not
receive severance payments in case of job destruction.6 V ER − V ET gives the potential gain
of a change in the labor market state to regular employment, which is multiplied by the
effective job offer arrival rate λ · θm(θ)(1 − γ). The effective on-the-job search arrival
rate of regular job offers exceeds the effective arrival rate of unemployed workers by λ
with λ ≥ 1. As the number of job seekers in θ includes both, unemployed workers and
temporary agency workers, the arrival rate θm(θ)(1 − γ) holds for workers in either of
the two labor market states. However, according to the stepping stone idea, workers that
engage in temporary agency employment signal their abilities and willingness to work to
potential employers and, therefore, face a higher arrival rate for regular jobs than workers
that look for a job out of being unemployed.
Firms are small and offer only one job. Before entering the market, firms ex-ante
decide which type of job vacancy to post, a regular or a temporary job vacancy. The
firm’s expected profits of posting a vacancy for a regular and a temporary job are
rpiVR = −hR +m(θ)[piFR − piVR ] (4.5)
rpiVT = −hT + φm(θ)[piFT − piVT ]. (4.6)
Posting a vacancy is costly. These costs are denoted by hR and hT for regular and
temporary job vacancies, respectively. It is assumed that posting a regular job vacancy
– which is more productive when filled – is more expensive, i.e. hR > hT . Rate m(θ)
is the rate at which a vacancy is filled with any type of job seeker. Since unemployed
and temporarily employed workers are both looking for a regular job, the arrival rate
6This covers the lack in employment protection legislation for temporary employment. In many
countries, the deregulation of temporary agency work was part of reforms in employment protection
explicitly aiming at temporary agency employment to be more flexible than regular employment.
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for firms that offer a regular job vacancy is m(θ). Temporary job vacancies can only be
filled with unemployed workers. Thus, the arrival rate has to be weighted by the share of
unemployed workers on all job seekers,
φ =
u
u+ (1− u)ελ. (4.7)
The gain of filling a regular job vacancy is piFR − piVR , while the gain of filling a temporary
job vacancy is piFT − piVT . Once a regular job vacancy is filled, the firm’s expected profit is
rpiFR = yR − w + δR[piVR − piFR − f ]. (4.8)
The firm’s flow profit is yR − w with yR being the production output and, hence, the
firm’s revenue. Wage rate w represents the firm’s instantaneous labor costs. The job is
destroyed at exogenous rate δR and the related loss from job destruction is pi
V
R − piFR − f .
Similarly, the firm’s expected profit of a filled temporary job is
rpiFT = yT − µw + δT [piVT − piFT ] + λθm(θ)(1− γ)[piVT − piFT ]. (4.9)
The flow profit of a filled temporary job is yT − µw. Temporary workers produce output
yT and the firm pays µw to the temporary employment agency. This is again in line with
Neugart & Storrie (2006). Parameter µ will be further specified in Section 4.3.3. Firms
lose piVT −piFT if a job is quit. Temporary employment can either be destroyed exogenously
at rate δT or it may be quit because the temporary worker succeeds in obtaining a regular
job. This occurs at rate λθm(θ)(1− γ). In contrast to regular jobs, firms do not have to
pay severance payments in case of job destruction.
4.3.3 Temporary Employment Agencies
Temporary employment agencies are small and offer only one job. They work as interme-
diaries between unemployed workers and firms. The agency hires a worker in a temporary
agency contract and lends the worker to a client firm for production. The firm pays a fee
µw to the agency, which passes the wage payment κw on to the worker. For the firm, it is
attractive not to directly employ the worker but to use the intermediary for two reasons:
First, firms do not have to pay non-wage severance payments to temporary agency workers
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in case of job destruction. Second, as unemployed workers try to use temporary jobs as a
stepping stone to regular employment, they tend to accept lower wages in temporary jobs.
This will be further specified in Section 4.3.4. The instantaneous profit of the temporary
employment agency is given by
rΩ = (µ− κ)w − c. (4.10)
The agency’s revenue for lending a worker to a client firm is µw and labor costs are
κw. Parameter c denotes regulatory, institutional costs. As stated in Section 4.1, the
sector of temporary agency employment has been – and partly still is – highly regulated.
Legal regulations like the re-employment ban (i.e. that it is not allowed to lend the same
worker to a client firm twice) or limitations in the maximum period of assignment of
workers create costs for firms and agencies. These various costs are catched by parameter
c. It may be argued that the agency does not have to bear all the costs of legal regulation
but some costs incur at the firm. This is accounted for by assuming free market entry
of agencies which drives profits down to zero, i.e. Ω = 0. Thus, all costs related to
temporary agency employment are passed on to the firms indirectly. Using the agency’s
zero profit condition, the mark-up µ that determines the costs that firms have to pay
using temporary workers in relation to the costs for regular employment is
µ =
κw + c
w
. (4.11)
Thus, there is a positive relationship between regulatory costs c and the mark-up µ. The
higher regulatory costs of temporary employment, the more expensive is its use.
4.3.4 Wage Bargaining and Labor Costs
The wage rate of regular workers is determined by individual bargaining between firms
and workers.7 In the determination of the labor income of temporary workers, this model
7To depict the European labor markets properly, it may make sense to model collective bargaining
for the wage determination of regular workers’ wage. The majority of wage agreements in Europe are
still based on collective bargaining between labor unions and employer organizations. In Germany, the
commitment level of firms to industry-wide multi-firm agreements is about 50 percent (Bru¨cker et al.,
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follows Neugart & Storrie (2006) by assuming that the wage payment for temporary
workers is set in a way that temporary agency workers are indifferent between temporary
employment and unemployment, i.e. V ET = V
U . This is appropriate for two reasons.
First, Jahn & Pozzoli (2013) show that there are substantial wage gaps between tempo-
rary and regular employed workers of up to 25%. At the same time, the replacement
ratio of unemployment benefits is usually about 70% of the pre-earned income. Thus, the
unemployment benefits are approximately of the same amount as labor income of tempo-
rary workers leading to more or less equal utilities of being unemployed or employed at a
temporary work agency. Second, the equal value condition simplifies the formal analysis
substantially.
Wages of regular workers are determined by bargaining between workers and firms.
The generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the worker and the firm can be stated
as
max
w
[
V ER − V U
]β[
piFR − piVR
]1−β
. (4.12)
Parameter β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the worker’s bargaining power. Maximizing the Nash prod-
uct and taking account of the equal value condition, V U = V ET , the wage rate is
w = z − δRf + (yR − z)Γ(θ, γ) with Γ(θ, γ) = β[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)]
r + δR + βθm(θ)(1− γ) , (4.13)
where Γ(θ, γ) denotes the worker’s effective bargaining power. This notation of the wage
rate and the effective bargaining power follows Cahuc et al. (2014). Appendix 4.A.1
provides the detailed derivation of the wage rate. Wage w is set as a mark-up over
unemployment benefits and lowered by the severance payments. This latter transfer is
weighted by its payment probability δR. The wage is higher, the higher the worker’s
effective bargaining power.
Applying the equal value condition, V ET = V
U , and using the worker’s value functions,
2012) and more than 40 percent of the firms that are not part of the industry-wide multi-firm agreements
nevertheless comply with the negotiated wage level (Ellguth & Kohaut, 2014). However, with the as-
sumption of small firms, bargaining of labor unions and employer organizations leads to the same result
as individual bargaining (see Masui, 2013). Thus, unions are left out in the present model.
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eqs. (4.3) and (4.4), the wage payment for temporary employed workers can be stated as
κw = z +
θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β . (4.14)
Appendix 4.A.2 provides the derivation of the wage income for temporary workers.
Eq. (4.14) shows that the wage payment of temporary workers κw decreases in search
intensity λ. With λ > 1, temporary workers even accept wage payments that are lower
than unemployment benefits. They do so as the high search intensity increases their
probability of finding a regular job. Thus, they temporarily accept a lower wage income.
4.3.5 Labor Demand and Equilibrium
Firms enter the market and open vacancies as long as the expected profit of posting a
vacancy is positive. Free market entry drives the expected profit of a vacancy down to
zero, i.e. piVT = pi
V
R = 0. Using the firm’s value functions of regular jobs, eq. (4.5) and (4.8),
the wage rate, eq. (4.13), and the firms’ free market entry condition, the equilibrium labor
demand for regular employment is
hR
m(θ)
=
(yR − z)(1− β)
r + δR + βθm(θ)(1− γ) . (4.15)
The average costs of a regular job vacancy (left-hand-side) equals the expected profit of
a filled job (right-hand-side). Similarly, using the firm’s value functions of agency jobs,
eqs. (4.6) and (4.9), the endogenously determined mark-up µ, eq. (4.11), the firms’ free
market entry condition, and the endogenously determined wage payment for temporary
workers, eq. (4.14), the equilibrium labor demand for temporary employment can be
derived to be
hT
φm(θ)
=
(yT − z − c)− θm(θ)(1−γ)(1−λ)β(yR−z)r+δR+θm(θ)(1−γ)β
r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ) . (4.16)
As for regular employment, eq. (4.16) states that firms demand temporary agency em-
ployment such that the average cost of a temporary job vacancy equals the firm’s expected
profit of a filled temporary job.
In equilibrium, the inflow into employment and the outflow back to unemployment
coincide, i.e. u˙ = 0. Job-seekers meet temporary job vacancies at rate θm(θ)γ. Mul-
tiplying this arrival rate with the unemployment rate u gives the instantaneous inflow
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into temporary employment. At the same time, temporary employment lT = (1 − u)ε
is destroyed at rate δT . Furthermore, due to on-the-job search for regular employment,
workers leave temporary agency employment at rate λθm(θ)(1−γ). Summarizing the in-
and outflows of temporary employment, in equilibrium it holds that
θm(θ)γu = (1− u)εδT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)(1− u)ε. (4.17)
Unemployed workers find regular employment at rate θm(θ)(1−γ) and, due to on-the-job
search, temporary workers enter regular employment at rate λθm(θ)(1− γ). At the same
time, regular employment lR = (1−u)(1− ε) is destroyed at rate δR. The equilibrium in-
and outflows of regular employment can, thus, be summarized as
θm(θ)(1− γ)u+ λθm(θ)(1− γ)(1− u)ε = (1− u)(1− ε)δR. (4.18)
Adding up eqs. (4.17) and (4.18), the flows into and out of overall employment are
θm(θ)u = (1− u)[εδT + (1− ε)δR]. (4.19)
Solving eq. (4.19) for u, the equilibrium rate of overall unemployment is
u =
εδT + (1− ε)δR
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR . (4.20)
Inserting eq. (4.20) into eq. (4.17), the equilibrium fraction of temporary agency employ-
ment on overall employment ε is
ε =
γδR
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)]+ δRγ . (4.21)
Inserting eqs. (4.20) and (4.21) into eq. (4.7), the fraction of unemployed workers on all
job seekers is
φ =
δT + (1− γ)λθm(θ)
δT + λθm(θ)
. (4.22)
Re-inserting eq. (4.22) into eq. (4.16), the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables
u, γ, ε, and θ can be determined using the equilibrium labor demand equations (4.15)
and (4.16), and the expressions for the unemployment rate and fraction of temporary
employment on overall employment, eqs. (4.20) and (4.21).
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4.4 Comparative Statics
The model can be used to examine several important questions related to temporary
agency employment. This section focuses on the effects of a legal deregulation of tempo-
rary agency employment as well as technological change, i.e. an increase in the produc-
tivity of both types of jobs. The latter is especially important as it may be an indirect,
but logical consequence of the legal deregulation of temporary agency employment. An
induced shift in the technology choice of firms in the economy may favor investments
especially in the technology that is used more intensively.
4.4.1 Deregulation of Temporary Agency Employment
Temporary agency employment was highly regulated in most European countries. As
discussed in Section 4.1, such regulations were, for example, that the maximum period
of assignment of temporary workers was limited, it was forbidden to employ the same
temporary agency worker twice at the same client firm, the period of employment at the
agency had to exceed the assignment period, or there have been equal pay obligations for
regular and temporary workers. The higher the degree of legal regulations, the higher the
regulatory and institutional costs for the use of temporary agency work in the production.
In recent years, there have been continuous efforts to deregulate temporary agency em-
ployment in almost all industrialized countries. Synchronization and re-employment bans
have been relaxed or abolished, equal pay obligations are circumvent and the maximum
period of assignment has been widely extended. The deregulation leads to a decrease in
regulatory and institutional costs. In the present model, these various regulatory and
institutional costs are modeled as c in the agency’s profit function and, thus, legal dereg-
ulation is depicted by a decrease in c. The effects of this deregulation on the model’s
endogenous variables can be summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 4.1. Legal deregulation of temporary agency employment (dc < 0) leads to
an increase in overall labor market tightness, θ. The fraction of temporary job vacancies
on all vacancies, γ, increases and a larger share of workers is employed in temporary
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agency employment, ε.8
dθ
dc
< 0,
dγ
dc
< 0,
dε
dc
< 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.3 provides the formal proofs.
It is straightforward that the share of temporary job vacancies on all vacancies in-
creases in legal deregulation as the decline in regulatory costs directly translates into re-
duced costs of temporary agency jobs. Firm’s expectations of increased profits from post-
ing temporary job vacancies and the production with temporary agency workers boosts
job creation in this sector. Firms enter the market and post vacancies until the expected
profit of a temporary job vacancy is again driven down to zero. The job inflow leads to
a higher rate of successful job matches, which increases overall labor market tightness.
Furthermore, the increase in the labor market tightness increases the worker’s overall job
offer arrival rate θm(θ) and, hence, reduces the workers duration of being unemployment,
which is defined as 1/θm(θ).
The tighter the labor market and the more temporary job vacancies are available, the
higher the share of temporary agency employment on overall employment, ε. Thus, the
technological orientation and organization of the economy shifts from the use of the more
advanced technology to the more intensive use of the less advanced, basic technology. The
increased attractiveness of temporary agency work substantially shifts the orientation of
the economy away from more advanced, innovative production.
Proposition 4.2. Legal deregulation (dc < 0) leads to an increase in temporary agency
employment, while the effects on regular employment and overall employment are ambigu-
ous.
du
dc
Q 0, dlT
dc
< 0,
dlR
dc
Q 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.3 provides the formal proofs.
8Note that the signs of the induced changes in the endogenous variables are – as in propositions 4.2
and 4.3, too – given in the correct formal way which suggests the direction of the change in the exogenous
parameter c to be positive. Therefore, as the deregulation in temporary agency employment is described
dc < 0, the effects of the legal deregulation are opposite to what the signs suggest at first sight.
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It follows from eq. (4.20) that there are two competing effects working on overall
employment. While the increase in labor market tightness θ favors overall job finding
θm(θ) and finally dampens unemployment, the induced change in the share of temporary
agency employment on overall employment increases the weighted average rate of job
destruction, εδT + (1 − ε)δR. The overall effect of a decrease in institutional costs c
therefore depends on the relative strength of both effects.9 In principle it holds that the
smaller the difference in the job destruction rates for temporary and regularly employed
workers, the more likely it is that overall employment increases in legal deregulation.
Despite the ambiguity in overall employment, the inflow of new firms that are posting
temporary agency jobs increases the number of successful job matches. The more firms
enter the market and post temporary job vacancies and the higher the worker’s job offer
arrival rate for temporary jobs θm(θ)γ, the higher the employment rate in temporary
agency jobs. Whether regular employment in- or decreases in legal deregulation, depends
– as for overall employment – on the strength of the effects in θ and ε and is therefore
ambiguous.
Proposition 4.3. A decline in legal regulation of temporary agency work (dc < 0) leads
to a decrease in the wage rate of regular workers, w, and an increase in the labor income
of temporary workers, κw.
dw
dc
> 0,
dκw
dc
< 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.3 provides the formal proofs.
The decrease in the wage rate of regular workers is caused by cheaper production
with temporary agency jobs. This leads to a wage restraint and dampens worker’s wage
claims in the wage negotiations with the firms. This is straightforward as higher wage
claims would lead to a substantial decrease in regular employment. The increase in labor
income in temporary agency jobs stems, first, from the increased demand for temporary
agency workers due to the inflow of new jobs in this sector and, second, from the fact
that the temporary workers’ chance of finding regular employment on-the-job declines
9Appendix 4.A.3 provides the detailed calculations and discusses in which cases the sign can clearly
be determined.
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and this decline in the employment outlook has to be substituted by an increase in the
wage payment to maintain the equality of the value of being unemployed and employed
in a temporary job.
Another interesting result following from the opposed changes in the wage income in
both types of jobs is that legal deregulation of temporary agency employment decreases
the wage differential and, thus, wage inequality in the model economy.
4.4.2 Technological Progress of Temporary Agency Production
One of the most important results of Section 4.4.1 is that legal deregulation of tempo-
rary agency employment leads to its more intensive use in the economy and, thus, to
a more intensive production with the less-advanced technology. Thinking about firms’
investments in research and development, it is reasonable for them to focus on invest-
ments in further development of technologies they favor and use more intensively. As a
logical consequence, the more attractive and the more likely the firm’s use of the basic
technology and production with temporary agency workers, the higher their incentive to
especially invest in that type of technology. The technological progress that results from
this development, i.e. the increase in production output yT , again, may have substantial
effects on the economy. Thus, in the following it is analyzed how an exogenous change in
the productivity of temporary agency production affects the macroeconomic equilibrium.
The results can be summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 4.4. Technological progress of temporary agency production leads to an in-
crease in overall labor market tightness, θ. Furthermore, the fraction of temporary job
vacancies on all vacancies, γ, and the share of workers that are employed in temporary
agency jobs, ε, both increase.
dθ
dyT
> 0,
dγ
dyT
> 0,
dε
dyT
> 0
Proof. Appendix 4.A.4 provides the formal proofs.
The more productive temporary agency jobs, the higher the firm’s expected profit
from production with temporary agency workers. Hence, the increased expected profit
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encourages firms to choose the less advanced technology and to enter the market by
posting temporary job vacancies. This boost increases the number of successful matches
and makes the labor market tighter, i.e. θ increases. As there are (relatively) more
vacancies to produce with temporary workers, γ increases. Furthermore, the availability of
temporary job vacancies increases the share of employment in temporary jobs, ε. Hence,
as similar to the deregulation of temporary agency work, technological progress of the
agency production shifts the production in the economy towards an even more intensive
use of the basic technology.
Proposition 4.5. Technological progress of temporary agency production leads to an in-
crease in temporary agency employment, lT , while the effects on overall employment and
regular employment, lR, are ambiguous.
dlT
dyT
> 0,
du
dyT
Q 0, dlR
dyT
Q 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.4 provides the formal proofs.
The enhanced posting of temporary job vacancies increases the number of successful
job matches in this sector and favors employment in temporary agency jobs. Concerning
the effects on overall unemployment an employment in regular jobs, the effect of techno-
logical progress in the less advanced technology is again ambiguous and depends on the
relative strength of its effect on labor market tightness and the economy’s average job
destruction in temporary agency jobs.
Proposition 4.6. Technological progress of temporary agency production leads to a de-
crease in the wage rate of regular workers, w, while it increases the wage payment of
agency workers, κw.
dw
dyT
< 0,
dκw
dyT
> 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.4 provides the formal proofs.
Due to the increased supply of temporary job vacancies and the increased profitability
of this production method, the worker’s bargaining power decreases. Workers have to
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reduce the wage claims which increase the firm’s profitability of the regular job. Fur-
thermore, the increased demand for temporary workers that is based on more inten-
sive temporary-job creation and the deteriorating outlook of finding regular employment
searching on-the-job require an increase in temporary workers wage payments.
To summarize, the effects of technological progress of the agency production coincide
with the macroeconomic effects of the legal deregulation of temporary agency work. For
technological progress being the consequence of more intensive investments in research
and development that are induced by the more intensive use of this technology due to the
deregulation, it even strengthens the initial effects of the deregulation. Most striking, it
intensifies the use of agency production in the economy.
4.4.3 Technological Progress of Regular Production
In Section 4.4.2 it was argued that the more intensive use of temporary agency production
and the related (basic) technology may give firms an incentive to invest more in this
technology. However, it is also important to analyze whether specific investments in
skill-biased technological change can improve the attractiveness of regular employment
and, hence, the more productive technology. If so, governmental support and subsidies
in research and development for more advanced technology and innovations may be a
suitable economic policy to dampen or even balance the effects that are induced by the
legal deregulation of temporary agency employment. Hence, this Section analyzes the
macroeconomic effects of progress of the more advanced technology that is used in regular
employment, yR. The results can be summarized in the following propositions.
Proposition 4.7. Technological progress of regular production leads to an increase in
overall labor market tightness θ. The fraction of temporary job vacancies on all vacancies,
γ, and the share of workers that are employed in temporary agency jobs, ε, both decrease.
dθ
dyR
> 0,
dγ
dyR
< 0,
dε
dyR
< 0
Proof. Appendix 4.A.5 provides the formal proofs.
The productivity increase in regular jobs increases its profitability. Firms post regular
job vacancies. This leads to a decreasing fraction of temporary job vacancies in the
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economy. The inflow of new regular job vacancies increases the number of successful job
matches and the tightness of the labor market, θ. The more regular job vacancies are
available, the higher the rate of successful matches of this type of jobs and the higher the
share of regular employment on overall employment, i.e. ε decreases.
Consequently, specific investments in more advanced technologies and public subsi-
dies in their research and development is a suitable economic policy to dampen or even
balance the unfavorable shift to more low-tech production that was induced by the legal
deregulation of temporary agency work.
Proposition 4.8. Technological progress of regular production decreases overall unem-
ployment. The rate of temporary agency employment, lT , decreases and the rate of regular
employment, lR, increases.
du
dyR
< 0,
dlT
dyR
< 0,
dlR
dyR
> 0
Proof. Appendix 4.A.5 provides the formal proofs.
The inflow of regular job vacancies increases the number of job matches. The effects
of technological progress in regular production favors the labor market tightness and,
due to the decrease in the share of temporary job creation, decreases the economy’s
average job destruction rate, εδT + (1− ε)δR. These two effects lead to an overall increase
in employment, i.e. a decrease in overall unemployment. Furthermore, the increase in
the supply of regular job vacancies increases the share of regular employment on overall
employment. Finally, the increase in overall employment and the inflow of jobs in regular
production yields the share of temporary employment to decrease.
Proposition 4.9. Technological progress in regular production leads to an increase in
the wage rate of regular workers, w, while the labor income of temporary worker, κw,
decreases.
dw
dyR
> 0,
dκw
dyR
< 0.
Proof. Appendix 4.A.5 provides the formal proofs.
The productivity increase in regular production increases the worker’s scope in the
wage negotiations. The effective bargaining power increases, leading to a higher wage
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rate for regular jobs. Furthermore, as the labor market becomes tighter and the fraction
of temporary job vacancies decreases – leading the arrival rate of regular job offers for
temporary workers searching on-the-job to increase – it dampens the wage payment that
is necessary to maintain the equality of being unemployed and temporarily employed.
Thus, κw decreases.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter develops a theoretical model to investigate the macroeconomic effects of
the legal deregulation of temporary agency employment and of exogenous technological
progress in the production. It especially focuses on the question of how the availabil-
ity of a cheaper, but less advanced, less productive production possibility influences the
technology choice of firms. Workers may either be directly hired by a firm (regular em-
ployment) or are employed at a temporary work agency and temporarily lend to client
firms for production (temporary employment). Firms are ex-ante flexible in the choice
of the technology to produce with. Before entering the market, they decide either to
post a regular or temporary job vacancy. Regular jobs are more productive than tempo-
rary jobs. Furthermore, both types of jobs differ in labor costs and in job destruction.
Temporary agency jobs are hit by job destruction more frequently. Unemployed workers
accept the first job offer they get, independent of which type it is. Once employed in
a temporary work agency, workers proceed searching on-the-job for regular employment.
This is reasonable because working in temporary jobs signals their ability and willingness
to work to other potential employers and, thus, increases their chance of finding a regular
job. Their effective job offer arrival rate of regular jobs is higher compared to that of
unemployed workers. Hence, workers use temporary agency jobs as a stepping stone to
regular employment. Wages of regularly employed workers are determined by individual
bargaining between workers and firms.
The model shows that the legal deregulation of temporary agency employment may
increase the overall employment. However, the effect is a priori ambiguous and depends
on the relative strengths on overall labor market tightness and average job-destruction
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in the economy. However, temporary agency employment increases unambiguously and,
thus, the technological orientation of the economy changes from the use of more advanced
technology to the more intensive use of the less advanced technology. The deregulation
of temporary agency employment changes the economy’s alignment away from high-tech
production and innovations. Furthermore, it is shown that regular workers suffer from
declining wages, while the inequality in labor income for temporary and regular workers
decreases.
Next to legal deregulation, the model is used to investigate the macroeconomic effects
of exogenous technological progress of the different production technologies. It is reason-
able to assume that firms especially invest in technologies that they use more favorably
and more intensively. Thus, the model shows that technological progress of temporary
agency production even strengthens the macroeconomic effects that are induced by the
legal deregulation. Temporary agency production will be used even more intensively and
the technological orientation further deteriorates to the more intensive use of the less
advanced technology.
Observing the consequences of legal deregulation and technological progress of tem-
porary agency employment, the chapter raises the question of suitable economic policy
instruments to dampen the depicted effects. It is shown that economic policies that
support directed investments in the more advanced technology dampen these effects.
Technological progress of the more advanced technology gives firms an incentive to use
advanced technologies more intensively. It increases overall employment in the economy
and changes its structure to the more regular employment and less temporary agency
employment. Furthermore, regular workers also gain in terms of increasing wages.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Derivation of the Wage Rate for Regular Workers
Maximization of the Nash product, eq. (4.12), leads to the sharing rule
β
[
piFR − piVR
]
= (1− β)[V ER − V U] (4.23)
Using the value functions (4.2) and (4.8), the rent of firms and workers can be substituted
by
V ER − V U =
w + δRf − rV U
r + δR
and piFR − piVR =
yR − w − δRf
r + δR
, (4.24)
respectively. Rearrangement leads to
w = βyR + (1− β)rV U − δRf (4.25)
Thus, the wage rate is the weighted sum of the worker’s productivity and the reservation
wage. Furthermore, the severance payment works like a staggered wage payment in case
of job destruction and, thus, has to be subtracted from the wage payment. Knowing that
the total surplus is S = V ER −V U +piFR−piVR , applying the equal value condition, V ET = V U ,
and using eq. (4.24), the expected value of being unemployed, eq. (4.3), can be rewritten
to
rV U =
z(r + δR) + θm(θ)(1− γ)βyR
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β . (4.26)
Inserting eq. (4.26) into eq. (4.25) leads, after some rearrangement, to the wage rate given
in eq. (4.13),
w = z − δRf + (yR − z)Γ(θ, γ) with Γ(θ, γ) = β[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)]
r + δR + βθm(θ)(1− γ) .
4.A.2 Derivation of the Wage Payment for Temporary Workers
Using eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) and applying the equal value condition, V ET = V
U , the wage
payment for temporary agency workers can implicitly be stated as
κw = z + θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)[V ER − V U] (4.27)
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From eq. (4.2) it follows that
V ER − V U =
w + δRf − rV U
r + δR
. (4.28)
Furthermore, inserting w = βyR + (1 − β)rV U − δRf and replacing rV U by eq. (4.26),
rearrangement leads to eq. (4.14),
κw = z +
θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β .
4.A.3 Comparative Statics for a Change in c
The Change in the Variables θ, γ, and ε
Total differentiation of the equilibrium labor demand for regular workers, eq. (4.15), gives
the change in γ that is induced by a change in c as
dγ
dc
= A0
dθ
dc
with A0 ≡
hR(1− γ)β ∂θm(θ)∂θ −m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)
hRθm(θ)β
. (4.29)
Recalling that m′(θ) < 0 and ∂θm(θ)/∂θ > 0, it is obvious that A0 > 0. Substituting
φ, the share of unemployed workers on all job seekers, by eq. (4.22), eq. (4.16) can be
rearranged to
hT
[
r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)
][
δT + λθm(θ)
]
= m(θ)
[
δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)
]
B0 (4.30)
with
B0 ≡ (yT − c− z)− θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β . (4.31)
Total differentiation of eq. (4.30) and rearrangement leads to
hTλ
[
(1− γ)[δT + θm(θ)] + [r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]
]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
−m′(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]B0dθ
dc
−m(θ)λ(1− γ)B0∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
+m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]
[
(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)(r + δR)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
]
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
= hTλθm(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)]
dγ
dc
−m(θ)λθm(θ)B0dγ
dc
−m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]
+m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]θm(θ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)(r + δR)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
dγ
dc
.
(4.32)
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Using eq. (4.16), the term B0 in the second line of eq. (4.32) can be substituted by
B0 =
hT
φm(θ)
[r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]. (4.33)
By rearranging eq. (4.16), the term in corner brackets in the third line of eq. (4.32) can
be substituted by
(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)(r + δR)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
=
(r + δR)
θm(θ)[r + δR + (1− γ)θm(θ)β] ·
(
(yT − z − c)− hT
m(θ)φ
(
r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)
))
.
(4.34)
After using eqs. (4.33) and (4.34) and further rearrangement, eq. (4.32) can be stated as
B1
dθ
dc
= B2
dγ
dc
−m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)] (4.35)
with
B1 ≡ hT [δT + λθm(θ)]
[
λθ2m(θ)2(1− γ)2β − (r + δR)(r + δT )
θm(θ)[r + δR + (1− γ)βθm(θ)]
]
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
+ hTλ
[r + δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]δTγ
δT + (1− γ)λθm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
−m′(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]B0
+m(θ)
[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)](yT − z − c)(r + δR)
θm(θ)[r + δR + (1− γ)θm(θ)β]
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
> 0
(4.36)
and
B2 ≡ −hTλθm(θ) δT + λθm(θ)
δT + (1− γ)λθm(θ)r
+m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]θm(θ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)(r + δR)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2 ,
(4.37)
which is negative for λ ≥ 1. Finally, substituting dγ/dc by eq. (4.29), it can be shown
that
dθ
dc
= −m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]
B1 −B2A0 < 0. (4.38)
Re-insertion of eq. (4.38) into eq. (4.29) shows that the change in γ that is induced by a
change in c can formally be stated as
dγ
dc
= −A0 m(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)]
B1 −B2A0 < 0. (4.39)
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Total differentiation of the equilibrium share of temporary agency employment on overall
employment, eq. (4.21), gives[
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
]
dε
dc
=
[
ε[δT + λθm(θ)] + (1− ε)δR
]
dγ
dc
− (1− γ)λε∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
.
(4.40)
After substituting dγ/dc in eq. (4.40) by eq. (4.29), the change in ε that is induced by a
change in c can be stated as
dε
dc
=
B3
hRβθm(θ)
[
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
] dθ
dc
< 0. (4.41)
with
B3 ≡hRβ(1− γ)[εδT + (1− ε)δR]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
−m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)
[
ε[δT + λθm(θ)] + (1− ε)δR
]
> 0.
(4.42)
Eq. (4.41) can easily be verified to be negative as both, the numerator and the denomi-
nator, are both positive and dθ/dc < 0.
Unemployment
From eq. (4.20) it can be seen that the change in the equilibrium unemployment rate u
depends on the changes in θ and ε. As dε/dc < 0, dθ/dc < 0, and ∂θm(θ)/∂θ > 0, it is
obvious that a change in c changes the numerator and denominator in the same direction
(for δT > δR). The overall change in u therefore depends on the relative strength of the
changes in θ and ε. Using eqs. (4.20) and (4.21), the unemployment rate can be expressed
as
u =
δRδT + δR(1− γ)λθm(θ)
δRδT + (1− γ)θm(θ)[δRλ+ δT + λθm(θ)] + θm(θ)δRγ . (4.43)
Differentiation of eq. (4.43) gives
du
dc
=
1
(B4)2
(
δRθm(θ)(δT − δR)[δT + λθm(θ)]dγ
dc
− δR
[
λ2θ2m(θ)2(1− γ)2 + 2δTλ(1− γ)θm(θ) + δT
(
δR + δT (1− γ)
)]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
)
(4.44)
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with B4 being the denominator of eq. (4.43), i.e. B4 ≡ δRδT + (1 − γ)θm(θ)[δRλ + δT +
λθm(θ)] + θm(θ)δRγ. Substitution of dγ/dc by eq. (4.29) leads to
du
dc
=
1
(B4)2
θhRδR
hRβθm(θ)
(
−m′(θ)B5 −B6
[
m(θ)2 +m′(θ)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
B7
)
dθ
dc
(4.45)
with B5 ≡ λ2(1− γ)2θ2m(θ)2 +λ(δR + δT )(1− γ)θm(θ) + δRδT (2− γ) and B6 ≡
[
r+ δR +
βθm(θ)(1 − γ)(δT − δR)(δT + λθm(θ))
]
. It is obvious that the sign of term B7 depends
on the parametrization of the model and the matching function. Intuition suggests the
sign of eq. (4.45) to be du/dc > 0. It is easy to show that B5 > B6. Thus, for eq. (4.45)
indeed to be positive, it is sufficient to show that for B5 = B6 the expression [−m′(θ) −
m(θ)−m′(θ)] < 0. Following Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001), assuming a Cobb-Douglas
matching function M = a ·v1−α ·sα with a denoting the efficiency of the matching process
and setting the matching elasticity α = 0.5, it turns out that with m(θ) = aθ−0.5 and
m′(θ) = −0.5aθ−1.5, the above inequality is fulfilled for 1/a2 < θ, which is the more likely
the higher the efficiency of the matching process is. Using a parametrization and Cobb-
Douglas matching function similar to Albrecht & Vroman (2002), it turns out that the
sign of eq. (4.45) is indeed du/dc > 0.
Regular Employment
Using eqs. (4.20) and (4.21), the rate of regular employment can be expressed as
lR =
(1− γ)θm(θ)[δT + λθm(θ)]
δRδT + θ2m(θ)2λ(1− γ)θm(θ)
[
δT (1− γ) + λδR(1− γ) + δRγ
] (4.46)
Differentiation of eq. (4.46) gives
dlR
dc
=− δR
(B8)2
(
θm(θ)[δT + θm(θ)][δT + λθm(θ)]
dγ
dc
+ (1− γ)
[
λθ2m(θ)2[γ(λ− 1)− λ]− 2δTλθm(θ)− δ2T
]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dc
)
,
(4.47)
with B8 denoting the denominator of eq. (4.46), i.e. B8 ≡ δRδT + θ2m(θ)2λ(1− γ)θm(θ)[
δT (1− γ) + λδR(1− γ) + δRγ
]
. While the term that is multiplied with dθ/dc is positive,
the term that is multiplied with dγ/dc is negative for γλ < γ + λ, which is fulfilled.
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Thus, without further assumptions about the matching function, the effect of a change in
costs c on regular employment is ambiguous. Using a parametrization and Cobb-Douglas
matching function similar to Albrecht & Vroman (2002), it turns out that the sign of
eq. (4.47) is dlR/dc > 0.
Temporary Agency Employment
Employment in temporary agency jobs is lT = (1 − u)ε. Using eq. (4.20), the rate of
temporary agency employment can be stated as
lT =
θm(θ)ε
εδT + (1− ε)δR + θm(θ) . (4.48)
Total differentiation of eq. (4.48) gives
dlT
dc
=
ε[εδT + (1− ε)δR]∂θm(θ)∂θ[
εδT + (1− ε)δR + θm(θ)
]2 dθdc + [δR + θm(θ)]θm(θ)[εδT + (1− ε)δR + θm(θ)]2 dεdc < 0. (4.49)
It is easy to verify that eq. (4.49) is negative since dθ/dc < 0 and dε/dc < 0.
Labor Income
The change in the wage rate, eq. (4.13), that is induced by a change in c is given by
dw
dc
= (yR − z)dΓ(θ, γ)
dc
. (4.50)
Total differentiation of the effective bargaining power Γ(θ, γ) leads to
dΓ(θ, γ)
dc
=
β(r + δR)(1− β)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
[
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(1− γ)dθ
dc
− θm(θ)dγ
dc
]
. (4.51)
Substituting of dγ/dc by eq. (4.29) and some rearrangement yields
dΓ(θ, γ)
dc
=
β(r + δR)(1− β)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)θm(θ)
hRθm(θ)β
dθ
dc
> 0. (4.52)
Eq. (4.52) is obviously positive as m′(θ) < 0 and dθ/dc < 0. Thus, according to eq. (4.50),
the change in the wage rate in a change in costs c is positive,
dw
dc
> 0. (4.53)
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Using eq. (4.14), labor income of temporary agency workers can be rewritten to
κw =
z(r + δR) + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
[
λz + (1− λ)yR
]
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β . (4.54)
Total differentiation of eq. (4.54) yields
dκw
dc
=
β(r + δR)(1− λ)(yR − z)[
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
]2((1− γ)∂θm(θ)∂θ dθdc − θm(θ)dγdc). (4.55)
Substituting dγ/dc in eq. (4.54) by eq. (4.29), the change in labor income or temporary
agency workers that is induced by a change in costs c is
dκw
dc
=
(r + δR)(1− λ)(yR − z)2(1− β)m′(θ)
hR
[
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
]2 dθdc , (4.56)
which is negative as λ > 0, m′(θ) < 0, and dθ/dc < 0. Thus,
dκw
dc
< 0.
From eqs. (4.53) and (4.56), it can be seen that the inequality in labor income of
regular and temporary agency workers increases in the costs c.
4.A.4 Comparative Statics for a Change in yT
The Change in the Variables θ, γ, and ε
Total differentiation of the equilibrium labor demand for regular workers, eq. (4.15), gives
the change in γ by a change in yT as
dγ
dyT
= A0
dθ
dyT
. (4.57)
The term A0 > 0 is known from eq. (4.29). Substituting φ by eq. (4.22), differentiation of
the equilibrium labor demand for temporary workers, eq. (4.16), and some rearrangement
leads to
B1
dθ
dyT
= B2
dγ
dyT
+m(θ)
[
δT + (1− γ)λθm(θ)
]
. (4.58)
The terms B1 and B2 are given in eqs. (4.36) and (4.37), respectively. After replacing
dγ/dyT by eq. (4.57), further rearrangement yields
dθ
dyT
=
m(θ)
[
δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)
]
B1 −B2A0 > 0. (4.59)
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The sign of eq. (4.59) can easily be verified since term A0 > 0, B1 > 0 and B2 < 0.
Re-insertion of eq. (4.59) into eq. (4.57) leads to
dγ
dyT
= A0
m(θ)
[
δT + λθm(θ)(1− γ)
]
B1 −B2A0 > 0. (4.60)
Total differentiation of the equilibrium share of temporary agency employment on
overall employment, eq. (4.21), rearrangement, and substitution of dγ/dyT by eq. (4.57),
the change in ε by a change in yT is
dε
dyT
=
B3
hRβθm(θ)
[
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
] dθ
dyT
> 0. (4.61)
Eq. (4.61) is positive as B3 > 0, given in eq. (4.42), and dθ/dyT > 0.
Unemployment
Differentiation of eq. (4.43) gives
du
dc
=
1
(B4)2
(
δRθm(θ)(δT − δR)[δT + λθm(θ)] dγ
dyT
− δR
[
λ2θ2m(θ)2(1− γ)2 + 2δTλ(1− γ)θm(θ) + δT
(
δR + δT (1− γ)
)]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dyT
)
(4.62)
where B4 denotes the denominator of eq. (4.43). Similar to the change in regulatory costs
c, it turns out that the change in the unemployment rate that is induced by a increase
in yT is ambiguous without further assumptions about the matching function. However,
the smaller the difference in the job destruction rates for temporary and regular jobs, the
more likely the change to be positive.
Regular Employment
Differentiation of eq. (4.46) gives
dlR
dyT
=− δR
(B8)2
(
θm(θ)[δT + θm(θ)][δT + λθm(θ)]
dγ
dyT
+ (1− γ)
[
λθ2m(θ)2[γ(λ− 1)− λ]− 2δTλθm(θ)− δ2T
]∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dyT
)
,
(4.63)
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with B8 denoting the denominator of eq. (4.46). As for changing regulatory costs c, the
effect of technological progress in temporary agency production on regular employment
is ambiguous.
Temporary Agency Employment
Differentiation of eq. (4.48) yields
dlT
dyT
=
ε[εδT + (1− ε)δR]∂θm(θ)∂θ[
εδT + (1− ε)δR + θm(θ)
]2 dθdyT + [δR + θm(θ)]θm(θ)[εδT + (1− ε)δR + θm(θ)]2 dεdyT > 0. (4.64)
Wage Rate w
The change in the wage rate, eq. (4.13), that is induced by a change in yT is given by
dw
dyT
= (yR − z)dΓ(θ, γ)
dyT
. (4.65)
Total differentiation of the effective bargaining power Γ(θ, γ) and substitution of dγ/dyT
by eq. (4.57) leads to
dΓ(θ, γ)
dyT
=
β(r + δR)(1− β)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)θm(θ)
hRθm(θ)β
dθ
dyT
< 0. (4.66)
Thus, according to eq. (4.65), the change in the wage rate in a change in costs yT is
negative,
dw
dyT
< 0.
4.A.5 Comparative Statics for a Change in yR
The Change in the Variables θ, γ, and ε
Total differentiation of the equilibrium labor demand for regular workers, eq. (4.15), and
some rearrangement leads to
C0
dθ
dyR
− (1− β)m(θ)
hRβθm(θ)
=
dγ
dyR
(4.67)
with
C0 ≡ 1
hRβθm(θ)
[∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(1− γ)βyR −m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)
]
> 0. (4.68)
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Total differentiation of the equilibrium labor demand for temporary agency workers,
eq. (4.16), yields, after some arrangement,
hTλ(1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dyR
−m′(θ)φB0 dθ
dyR
−m(θ)B0∂φ
∂θ
dθ
dyR
+m(θ)φ
(r + δR)(1− γ)(1− λ)β(yR − z)[
r + δR + (1− γ)βθm(θ)
]2 ∂θm(θ)∂θ dθdyR = hTλθm(θ) dγdyR
+m(θ)B0
∂φ
∂γ
dγ
dyR
+m(θ)φ
∂B0
∂γ
dγ
dyR
−m(θ)φ θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
(4.69)
with
∂φ
∂θ
= −
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
λγδT
[δT + θm(θ)λ]2
,
∂φ
∂γ
= − λθm(θ)
[δT + λθm(θ)]
, (4.70)
∂B0
∂θ
= −β(1− γ)(1− λ)(yR − z)(r + δR)[
r + δR + (1− γ)θm(θ)β
]2 ∂θm(θ)∂θ , (4.71)
and
∂B0
∂γ
=
β(1− λ)(yR − z)(r + δR)θm(θ)[
r + δR + (1− γ)θm(θ)β
]2 . (4.72)
Substitution of B0 by eq. (4.31) and further rearrangement leads to
C1
dθ
dyR
= C2
dγ
dyR
−m(θ)φ θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β (4.73)
with
C1 ≡−m′(θ)φB0 −m(θ)B0∂φ
∂θ
+m(θ)φ
(r + δR)(yT − c− z)[
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
]
θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
+ hT
λθ2m(θ)2(1− γ)2β − (r + δR)(r + δT )[
r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β
]
θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
> 0
(4.74)
and
C2 ≡ m(θ)φ∂B0
∂γ
− hTλθm(θ)r
δT + (1− γ)λθm(θ) < 0. (4.75)
Finally, using eq. (4.67), it turns out that
dθ
dyR
= − 1
C1 − C2C0
[
C2
m(θ)(1− β)
βhRθm(θ)
+m(θ)φ
θm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + (1− γ)βθm(θ)
]
> 0. (4.76)
It is easy to verify that eq. (4.76) is positive as C0 > 0, C1 > 0, C2 < 0 and λ ≥ 1.
Re-substitution of eq. (4.76) into eq. (4.67) gives
dγ
dyR
=
C3
C1 − C2C0 (4.77)
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with
C3 ≡ −C0m(θ)φθm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + (1− γ)βθm(θ) − C1
m(θ)(1− β)
hRβθm(θ)
. (4.78)
Inserting C0 and C1 into eq. (4.78), it can be written as
1
hRβθm(θ)
(
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)φ(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + βθm(θ)(1− γ)
[
hRβ(1− γ)θm(θ)
+m(θ)(r + δR)
(1− β)(yR − z)
r + δR + β(1− γ)θm(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hR/m(θ)
]
+m′(θ)(yR − z)(1− β)m(θ)φθm(θ)(1− γ)(1− λ)β
r + δR + β(1− γ)θm(θ)
−m(θ)(1− β)
[
−m′(θ)φB0 −m(θ)∂φ
∂θ
B0 + λhT (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
])
.
(4.79)
Further simplification and rearrangement finally yields
C3 =
1
hRβθm(θ)
(
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)(1− γ)[hRφ(1− λ)β + hTλ(1− β)]
+m(θ)2(1− β)∂φ
∂θ
B0 +m
′(θ)(1− β)m(θ)φ(yT − c− z)
)
,
(4.80)
which is negative as ∂φ/∂θ < 0 and m′(θ) < 0. Thus, it turns out that eq. (4.77) is
negative and hence
dγ
dyR
< 0.
Total differentiation of the equilibrium share of temporary employment on overall em-
ployment, eq. (4.21), and some rearrangement gives
dε
dyR
=− ε (1− γ)λ[
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
] ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dyR
+
δR[δT + λθm(θ)][
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
]2 dγdyR ,
(4.81)
which can easily be verified to be negative as dθ/dyR > 0 and dγ/dyR < 0.
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Unemployment
Total differentiation of the equilibrium unemployment rate, eq. (4.20), yields
du
dyR
=− u
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dyR
+
(δT − δR)θm(θ)[
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR
]2 dεdyR < 0,
(4.82)
which can easily be verified to be negative as dθ/dyR > 0 and dε/dyR < 0.
Regular Employment
Total differentiation of lR = (1− ε)(1− u) yields
dlR
dyR
= −(1− u) dε
dyR
− (1− ε) du
dyR
> 0. (4.83)
Temporary Agency Employment
Using eqs. (4.20) and (4.21), employment in agency job, lT = (1− u)ε, can be expressed
as
lT =
θm(θ)ε
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR . (4.84)
Total differentiation of eq. (4.84) leads to
dlT
dyR
=
ε
[
εδT + (1− ε)δR
][
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR
]2 ∂θm(θ)∂θ dθdyR + θm(θ)
[
θm(θ + δR)
][
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR
]2 dεdyR .
(4.85)
After substitution of dε/dyR by eq. (4.81), further rearrangement finally leads to
dlT
dyR
=
1[
θm(θ) + εδT + (1− ε)δR
]2
[(
δT − λθ2m(θ)2(1− γ)
(1− γ)[δT + λθm(θ)] + δRγ
)
dθ
dyR
+δR[δT + θm(θ)]
dγ
dyR
]
< 0.
(4.86)
Wage Rate w
The change in the wage rate, eq. (4.13), that is induced by a change in yR is given by
dw
dyR
= Γ(θ, γ) + (yR − z)dΓ(θ, γ)
dyR
. (4.87)
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Total differentiation of the effective bargaining power Γ(θ, γ) leads to
dΓ(θ, γ)
dyR
=
β(r + δR)(1− β)
[r + δR + θm(θ)(1− γ)β]2
[∂θm(θ
∂θ
(1− γ) dθ
dyR
− θm(θ) dγ
dyR
]
> 0, (4.88)
and therefore
dw
dyR
> 0.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Temporary agency employment has gained much attention in public discussion and is still
one of the most controversial discussed labor market instruments that politicians may use
to make labor markets more flexible. Even if the rate of temporary agency employment
is just about 2% of total employment in most industrialized countries, it is more inten-
sively used in some sectors, especially in manufacturing, and therefore an issue politicians
and the market participants have to cope with. This thesis contributes to the discussion
about temporary agency employment and develops three theoretical models to examine
the effects on selected economic determinants. It analyzes the optimal economic behavior
of labor unions when firms threaten to use temporary agency work in the wage bargaining
process to dampen the wage claims of the labor unions. Furthermore, it investigates the
effect of the ongoing deregulation of temporary agency work on macroeconomic deter-
minants like employment and the employment structure, and finally discusses how the
technological alignment and orientation of the economy changes due to less expensive and
more attractive temporary agency employment.
Chapter 2 aims at providing a better theoretical understanding of the effects of tem-
porary agency work on the wage-setting process, labor unions’ rents, firms’ profits, and
employment. Using a monopoly union model, a special variant of the right-to-manage
model in which labor unions have the full wage-setting power, it is shown that labor
unions may find it optimal to accept lower wages to prevent firms from using temporary
agency workers. It is analyzed under which conditions and to which extent unions should
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adjust their wage claims downward and it is formally examined how the different options
that labor unions and firms have in the bargaining process affect their utility and profit,
respectively. It is shown it is optimal for firms to threaten the labor unions with the use
of temporary agency employment as this leads to the highest profit possible. At the same
time, labor unions inevitably suffer from the threat or actual use of temporary agency
work and may, in order to minimize the loss in their utility, adjust their wage claims. Next
to the formal analysis of the optimal behavior of firms and unions, the model provides an
important contribution to the discussion of the effect of temporary agency work in the
wage-setting process that should be considered in empirical research. As it is not observ-
able in retrospect whether firms threatened the labor unions with substitution of parts
of the workforce by temporary agency employment in the bargaining process, the firms’
option to use agency workers may affect wage setting also in those firms that observably
only employ regular workers. Furthermore, the model shows that if firms decide to employ
temporary agency workers, the labor union’s wage claims will increase for the remaining
regular workers – and even exceed the level that labor unions claim without being threat-
ened with temporary agency employment. An intensive use of temporary agency workers
in high-wage firms may therefore be the cause and not the consequence of the high wage
level in those firms. Finally, even though the model assumes monopoly unions that ascribe
the highest possible wage-setting power to the unions, the model shows that the economic
rents of labor unions decline because of the firms’ option to use temporary agency work,
whereas firms’ profits may increase.
Chapter 3 seizes on the continuous deregulation efforts concerning temporary agency
employment in almost all European countries that took part in recent decades. It comes
off from the focus on the individual optimal behavior of the market participants and pro-
vides a general equilibrium matching model to investigate the effects of this labor market
policy on wage setting and the employment structure in a unionized economy. Building
up a matching model with multiple-worker firms that produce differentiated goods using
regular employment and – optionally – temporary agency workers, firm-level labor unions,
and temporary workers that search on-the-job for regular employment, it is shown that
the institutional and legal deregulation increases overall employment. Due to the impact
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of cheaper temporary agency employment it deteriorates labor union’s bargaining position
and leads to lower wages and higher regular, union covered, employment. Furthermore,
and more surprisingly, the model identifies a hump-shaped relationship between the de-
gree of legal deregulation of temporary agency employment and the rate of temporary
employment used in the production process. This relationship is based on voluntary,
non-institutional agreements between firms and employee representations to limit the use
of temporary agency employment at the firm-level. Such agreements become more im-
portant, the less expensive and therefore the more attractive temporary agency work is
for firms. However, as such non-institutional agreements play an important role in the
work of European employee representations in firms that operate in the manufacturing
sector, the model sheds light on a plausible explanation for why the rate of temporary
agency employment stays stable at a relatively low level in almost all industrialized coun-
tries. Furthermore, by showing that the deregulation does not lead to a steady increase
in temporary agency employment but favors the rate of regular employment, it falsifies
one of the main arguments of the opponents of temporary agency work which is that this
form of employment inevitably leads to more precarious employment. The model suggests
that the rate of temporary agency employment may even decrease despite its deregula-
tion. However, the model does not conceal that even if the rate of regular employment
increases, individual workers and labor unions suffer from the deregulation by declining
wages and a reduction in labor union’s utility.
Chapter 4 sets the focus on the technological orientation of the economy and the effect
of the deregulation of temporary agency employment on the technology choice of firms. In
the matching framework, it develops a model setting with two types of firms that produce
the same good but either use regular employment or temporary agency employment for the
production. The jobs differ in the technology used and regular jobs are more productive
than temporary agency jobs. Workers randomly match with these vacancies. While labor
costs for temporary agency work is less expensive than for regular work, job destruction
and labor turnover is higher in agency jobs. Moreover, there is additional volatility in
temporary agency jobs as temporary workers search on-the-job for regular employment.
The model suggests that the institutional deregulation of temporary agency work leads
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to a more intensive use of the less productive technology and increases temporary agency
employment. Workers that are employed in regular jobs suffer from declining wage rates,
while the labor income of temporary workers increases. While the rate of temporary
agency employment increases, the effect on regular and overall employment is ambiguous
due to competing effects on the overall labor market tightness and and the job destruction
rate in the economy. Next to the assessment of the change in the technological orientation
due to the legal deregulation, the model investigates the effects of technological progress of
the less advanced technology that is used in the production with agency workers. It shows
that progress of this technology even strengthens the effects of the legal deregulation.
Finally, it suggests that subsidies or other forms of support for directed investments
in technological progress of more advanced technologies may be suitable economic policy
instruments to dampen the macroeconomic effects of the deregulation of temporary agency
work.
